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Brian Galle* & David I. Walker† 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Nonprofit organizations suffer from agency problems that are similar to 
or perhaps even more severe than those observed at for-profit companies.  As a 
result, one might expect the executive pay setting process in the two sectors to 
reflect similar deficiencies.  This Article explains why the managerial power 
theory that was developed to help explain for-profit executive pay is plausibly 
applicable to nonprofits.  More importantly, this Article offers new evidence 
based on data from a large panel of colleges and universities collected across a 
nine year period that supports the idea that potential stakeholder outrage plays a 
role in limiting nonprofit executive pay.  For example, we find for the first time 
evidence of an otherwise counter-intuitive negative association between the 
fraction of university revenue provided by current donations and president 
compensation.  We also are the first to find that excess executive pay reduces 
donations.  These findings support the hypothesis that donors with less leverage 
suffer from significant agency costs in setting president pay.  We discuss the 
implications of these findings for the regulation of nonprofits and for a broader 
understanding of the pay-setting process at for-profit as well as nonprofit 
organizations.  For example, we note that our results are consistent with the view 
that, absent reforms, presidents may have self-interested incentives to increase 
tuition.
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Introduction 
The compensation of the presidents of private U.S. colleges and universities has risen at a 
rapid clip over the past fifteen years.  In the decade between 1998 and 2007, average president 
pay increased by 50% in real, inflation-adjusted, terms, far outpacing gains in overall university 
expenditures and even eye-catching increases in tuition rates.1  In 2010, thirty-six university 
presidents received pay packages in excess of $1 million.2   
These data spark questions about the executive pay setting process in this nonprofit 
sector.  Why has compensation increased so dramatically?  What explains the variation in pay 
from school to school?  More generally, do the managerial agency problems that many observers 
believe contribute to outsized pay packages at public companies in the U.S. also play a role at 
nonprofits, such as these private colleges and universities? 3       
The relationship between managerial agency problems and executive pay has been a 
central focus of academic research over the last several decades.4  A key question has been 
whether pay practices reflect agency problems or mitigate those problems or both.5  One school 
of thought---which one of us, together with Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, dubbed the 
“managerial power” hypothesis--- suggests that managers at for-profit firms have been able to 
extract inefficiently high compensation from their employers. 6  The rational ignorance of 
widely-dispersed shareholders, and managers’ strong influence over the directors appointed to 
watch the managers, leaves some managers constrained mainly by actual or potential “outrage,” 
                                                 
1
 See infra Part III.A. 
2
 The Chronicle of Higher Education, Executive Compensation at Private Colleges, 2010: 
https://chronicle.com/article/Executive-Compensation-at/136165/#id=table (last accessed July 22, 2013). 
3
 “Agency” costs arise when stakeholders or principals must rely for direction of the organization on imperfectly-
controlled managers or “agents” who do not always act in the best interest of the stakeholders.  See Michael C. 
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 
3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308--10 (1976). 
4
 The literature is both voluminous and highly interdisciplinary.  Important contributions have come from law, 
economics, corporate finance, and accounting, among other fields.  Surveys include David I. Walker, The Law and 
Economics of Executive Compensation: Theory and Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
CORPORATE LAW 232 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012); Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, 
in 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2485, 2509–10 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999); John E. Core 
et al., Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 27; and Carola 
Frydman & Dirk Jenter, CEO Compensation, 2 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 75 (2010). 
5
 The traditional view, known as the “optimal contracting” view, is that executive pay arrangements are designed to 
minimize agency costs by aligning the incentives of managers and owners.  See infra Part I.A. 
6
 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of 
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 783--86 (2002).  
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the emotional and ideological responses of the shareholders and press watchdogs who notice 
what is happening.7   
As evidence for their claim, managerial-power theorists point to the highly opaque pay 
structures managers have constructed for themselves.8  These structures, they say, serve no other 
important purpose for the firm except to reduce outrage at the amount the managers earn.9  The 
managerial power theory is hardly undisputed, though.  Critics point to possible justifications for 
some arcane pay practices.10  Despite the policy importance of the debate, and the widespread 
academic interest it has drawn, direct evidence that looming shareholder “outrage,” rather than 
some corporate purpose, motivates the questionable practices is scarce.  That is why managerial 
power theorists have so far had to rely on inference.   
To date, the debate has focused primarily on executive pay in the for-profit sector and, in 
large part, on public company executive pay.11  There has been relatively little research on 
executive pay in the nonprofit sector.12  Commentators recognize that agency problems exist in 
                                                 
7
 Id. at 786-88. 
8
 Id. at 789; Lucian Bebchuk & Robert Jackson, Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L. 823 (2005) (documenting 
significant utilization of highly opaque executive pension arrangements); see also infra Part I.A. (discussing 
numerous pay practices that are difficult to explain as part of an optimal contract but that are an understandable 
outgrowth of managerial power);. 
9
 Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 795-96. 
Several important recent Wall-Street reforms, such as SEC efforts to improve the disclosure of executive 
compensation and to grant shareholders a “say on pay,” appear to be premised on the idea that latent shareholder 
discontent can affect corporate behavior. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. 
Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323 (2009). 
10
 See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power Versus the Perceived Cost of 
Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 857--67 (2002); John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Randall S. Thomas, Is U.S. 
CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142 (reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK 
& JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)).  
For an overview of the debate in the context of retirement pay for executives, see Kelli A. Alces & Brian D. Galle, 
The False Promise of Risk-Reducing Executive Pay: Evidence from Executive Pensions and Deferred 
Compensation, 38 J. CORP. L. 53, 57--64, 82--86 (2012). 
11
 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 3, Core et al., supra note 4, and Frydman & Jenter, supra note 4.  There is also an 
emerging literature on executive pay in the private equity/venture capital arena.  See Philip Leslie & Paul Oyer, 
Managerial Incentives and Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity 8 (November 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://www.stanford.edu/~pleslie/private%20equity.pdf; Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Private 
Equity and Executive Compensation (July 12, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
12
 See Kevin F. Hallock, Managerial Pay and Governance in American Nonprofits, 41 IND. REL.: J. ECON. & SOC. 
377, 404 (2002) (“Little is known about the compensation of managers of nonprofits….”).  For prior discussions of 
the dynamics of nonprofit compensation in the legal literature, see Roger C. Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: 
Trending Toward Decay, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 37--38 (2011); Peter Frumkin & Alice Andre Clark, Nonprofit 
Compensation and the Market, 21 U. HAWAII L. REV. 425 (1999); Consuelo Lauda Kertz, Executive Compensation 
Dilemmas in Nonprofit Organizations: Reasonableness, Comparability, and Disclosure, 71 TULANE L. REV. 819 
(1997); Benjamin Leff, The Case Against For-Profit Charity, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 819, 868--76 (2012); Evelyn 
A. Lewis, Charitable Waste: Consideration of a Waste Not, Want Not Tax, 30 VA. TAX REV. 39 (2010).  Of these, 
only Leff addresses agency costs at all, and his focus is on the extent to which paying managers with a share of firm 
profits would increase agency costs for donors, id. at 870.  A few non-legal sources briefly connect managerial pay 
at nonprofits to possible agency costs, but do not analyze the situation in any depth.  E.g., James A. Brickley & R. 
Lawrence van Horn, Managerial Incentives in Nonprofit Organizations: Evidence from Hospitals, 45 J. L. & ECON. 
227, 228 n.4 (2002) (noting that high executive pay at nonprofits could be a sign of agency costs). 
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the nonprofit sphere, allowing managers to run organizations in ways donors or other 
stakeholders might not approve.13  But while managers may make some choices donors would 
not, the dominant view is that nonprofit managers can largely be trusted not to over-pay 
themselves because they are committed to their cause, and because in any event monitoring by 
nonprofit boards and peers is effective at constraining any excessive compensation.14  Perhaps as 
a result, no prior work, as far as we can tell, attempts to analyze nonprofit executive 
compensation through a managerial power framework.  However, as we will explain, some 
earlier findings can be explained through that lens. 15   
                                                 
13
 E.g., Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838--51 (1980); M. Todd 
Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 598--
600 (2009); Jill Horwitz, Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter?, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 159 (2007); Robert A. Katz, 
Can Principal-Agent Models Help Explain Charitable Gifts and Organizations, 2000 WISC. L. REV. 1, 4--6; 
Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999 WISC. L. REV. 227, 230--
36; Mark V. Pauly & Michael Redisch, The Not-for-Profit Hospital as Physicians' Cooperative, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 
87 (1973); Usha Rodrigues, Entity & Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257, 1267--71 (2011).  For a review, see Marc 
Jegers, “Corporate” Governance in Nonprofit Organizations, 20 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 143, 145--59 
(2009).  Empirical evidence on this point includes Core, Guay, and Verdi, who find evidence that nonprofits’ build-
up of endowments may serve managerial interests, see John E. Core et al., Agency Problems of Excess Endowment 
Holdings in Not-for-Profit Firms, 41 J. ACCOUNTING & ECON. 307, 309 (2006), and Klick & Sitkoff, who find that 
markets appear to view charitable trusts as less reliable custodians of shareholder value than for-profit corporations, 
Jonathan Klick & Robert Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corporate Control: Evidence from 
Hershey’s Kiss-Off, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 816 (2008). 
14
 MARC JEGERS, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS OF NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 46 (2008); Eugene F. Fama & Michael 
C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. LAW & ECON. 301, 318--19 (1983) [hereinafter Fama & 
Jensen, Separation]; Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J. LAW & 
ECON. 327, 344--45 (1983) [hereinafter Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems]; Bruce R. Kingma, Public Good 
Theories of the Non-profit Sector: Weisbrod Revisited, 82 VOLUNTAS 135, 142 (1997); Gregory O. Jobome, 
Management Pay, Governance, and Performance: The Case of Large U.K. Nonprofits, 22 FIN. ACCOUNTABILITY & 
MGMT. 331, 334 (2006); Stijn van Puyvelde et al., The Governance of Nonprofit Organizations: Integrating Agency 
Theory with Stakeholder and Stewardship Theories, 41 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 431, 436 (2012) see 
Ralf Caers et al., Principal-Agent Relationships on the Stewardship-Agency Axis, 17 NONPROFIT MGMT. & 
LEADERSHIP 25, 28--31, 33--34 (2006) (explaining this theory and noting evidence that it seems to guide nonprofit 
boards); Myron J. Roomkin & Burton A. Weisbrod, Managerial Compensation and Incentives in For-Profit and 
Nonprofit Hospitals: Is There a Difference?, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 750, 751--52 (1999) (suggesting that nonprofit 
firms use compensation structures to select managers who are not motivated by money and do not need close 
monitoring to prevent diversion of funds); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory, 34 J. 
ECON. LIT. 701, 716 (1996) (suggesting that ideological commitment helps to overcome agency problems in some 
nonprofits).  But cf. George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms, 
Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1147--48 (2004) 
(noting that boards of complex nonprofits have many members, creating substantial opportunities for free riding).  In 
the case of universities, Fama & Jensen argue that internal monitoring by other constituencies, such as faculty, and 
outside reviewers allow inexpert donors to effectively oversee presidents and other top management.  Fama & 
Jensen, Separation, supra, at 321.   
We are not aware of any significant evidence to support these claims.  See infra part I.B.   
15
 E.g., Edward A. Dyl et al., Governance and Funds Allocation in United States Medical Research Charities, 16 
FIN. ACCOUNTABILITY & MGMT. 335, 336 (2000) (reporting that presence of managers on board coincided with 
increased managerial pay); Raymond Fisman & R. Glenn Hubbard, Precautionary Savings and the Governance of 
Nonprofit Organizations, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 2231, 2240 (2005) (reporting that compensation in nonprofit sector is 
more highly correlated with donations in states where Attorney General has fewer oversight powers).   
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We think this neglect is unfortunate, for several reasons.  For one, given the central roles 
played by emotion and ideology in the formation and support of charitable organizations, the 
nonprofit sector seems to be a promising laboratory for exploring the nuances of an outrage-
focused managerial power theory.16  As we’ll argue, aspects of nonprofits provide an opportunity 
to test more directly for an outrage constraint, and evidence of the operation of an outrage 
constraint on executive pay in the nonprofit sector would bolster the theory more generally.  In 
addition, we think that extending managerial-power insights to nonprofit organizations can 
potentially help to explain and shape nonprofit pay.  Significant evidence of managerial power 
should motivate both stakeholders and regulators of nonprofits to give more attention to existing 
governance rules. 
Accordingly, we theorize and then construct a test for managerial power in nonprofit 
executive pay-setting.  Although we think adding this new theoretical approach to nonprofit 
analysis is itself useful, our primary contribution arises out of our analysis of the compensation 
of private college and university presidents from 1999 through 2007.17  We investigate the 
“determinants” of president compensation, that is, which aspects of universities or their leaders 
are statistically correlated with greater or lesser pay.   
As in the for-profit sector, we find, unsurprisingly, that executive compensation is a 
function of organization size and tenure in office.18  But more importantly, we find evidence 
consistent with stakeholder outrage constraining executive pay.  For example, we find that 
president pay is lower at religiously-affiliated institutions.19  This result is consistent with the 
managerial power theory if one assumes, we think reasonably, that observer expectations 
regarding “acceptable” levels of president compensation would be lower at religiously affiliated 
institutions, although we acknowledge other more benign explanations could also fit our results.   
In addition, we find that president pay is lower at institutions that are more highly 
dependent on current donations as a source of revenue (versus tuition, grants, etc.), which we 
interpret as a sign of managerial power.20  The theory here is that active donors provide a source 
of potential outrage over pay that would be effective in dampening pay.  Schools that are 
relatively insulated from this effect would be less constrained in setting compensation.  Absent 
outrage constraints, one would expect university president compensation to increase when 
contributions rise, as more effective fundraisers are rewarded for their success.  The fact that 
more powerful donors are able to drive down pay levels implies that presidents at schools with 
less-influential donors are extracting more pay than donors would want.   
                                                 
16
 See infra Part II.  
17
 See infra Part III. 
18
 As one would expect, greater organization size and longer tenures are both positively associated with higher levels 
of president pay.  See infra Part III.C. 
19
 See infra text accompanying note 76. 
20
 See infra Part III.C. 
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As a further check on our hypothesis, we analyze for the first time in the literature the 
impact of executive pay levels on future giving.  In order for potential donor outrage to act as a 
disciplining force on pay levels, it must be the case that donors care about and, in aggregate, 
respond negatively to high president pay levels.  We find a negative association between 
reported pay levels and future giving, which is consistent with the idea that donors dislike and 
respond to excessive pay.21 
We think our findings suggest not only the importance of outrage but also the likelihood 
of managerial power.  Returning to the observation that led off this introduction, it would be 
difficult to explain a 50% increase in university president pay levels between 1998 and 2007 as 
simply an increase in the cost of talent across this decade, particularly given the fact that public 
company executive pay levels were essentially flat over the same period.  However, gross tuition 
dollars were up on average about 40% over this period, increasing access to funds that are 
insulated from donor outrage, and the process of benchmarking pay levels against the pay of 
presidents of peer institutions became ubiquitous at universities and other nonprofits around 
2002.  Under an agency cost view, this combination of factors would be consistent with an uptick 
in the upward trend of university president pay levels at about that time.22   
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows.  Part I provides background and a 
brief overview of the leading theories of the executive pay setting process.  Part II extends the 
theory to nonprofit organizations and discusses the testable implications of our theory in the 
context of higher education.  In Part III, we describe our data, present our analyses, and interpret 
the results.  Part IV considers the implications of our analyses.  Part V concludes.  We also 
include a Methodological Appendix detailing the finer points of our empirical analysis. 
I.  Executive Pay in the For-Profit and Nonprofit Sectors 
Although the analytical focus of this Article is on executive pay in the nonprofit sector, 
specifically in higher ed, the theoretical work on executive pay is dominated by work on public 
company executive pay.  This Part, and the Part that follows, provide a brief overview of that 
literature and explain why the managerial power theory of the executive pay setting process is as 
plausibly applicable to the nonprofit sector as to the for-profit sector.  This theoretical link is 
important for two reasons.  First, it provides a sound basis for the analysis of college and 
university president pay that follows.  Second, it paves the way for the claim made later in the 
Article that evidence of an outrage constraint operating in the nonprofit sector is evidence 
supporting the managerial power theory in the for-profit sector as well, which represents an 
additional payoff to our work. 
                                                 
21
 It is not obvious that donors would react negatively to high president pay levels.  Some donors might view high 
pay levels as a signal of high quality that inspires confidence in giving.  However, as described more thoroughly 
below, the evidence indicates a negative correlation between compensation and donations.  See infra Part III.D. 
22
 See infra Part III.F. 
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A. Public Company Executive Pay 
 There are two competing, but to some degree complementary theories of the executive 
pay setting process at U.S. public companies.23  The optimal contracting theory, which 
dominates the corporate finance literature on executive pay, posits that executive pay is designed 
to minimize managerial agency costs that arise from the separation of ownership from control in 
the widely held, Berle/Means corporation.24  As described by Jensen and Meckling, these agency 
costs reflect the divergence between share value maximizing actions of managers and managers’ 
actual actions, plus the monitoring and bonding expenditures (including contracting costs) 
undertaken to reduce that divergence.25  Under this view, equity compensation arrangements 
through which managers receive restricted stock, stock options, and the like, and long-term non-
equity incentive plans are seen as minimizing agency costs and contributing to shareholder value 
by tying executive pay to long-term share price performance.26   
 One of the key insights of this literature is that corporate executives tend to be badly 
underdiversified, with excessive financial capital as well as their human capital tied up in their 
firms.27  As a result, all else being equal, these executives would be more risk averse than their 
shareholders, who can easily diversify.  Paying executives with restricted company stock28 tends 
to aggravate the gap between managerial and shareholder risk preferences.  However, because 
the value of stock options increases with share price volatility (i.e., risk), adding options to 
executive pay plans can bring executive risk preferences back into line with those of 
shareholders.29  This is the optimal contracting explanation for the prevalence of option 
compensation.30 
 Proponents of the optimal contracting view do not insist that directors always bargain 
vigorously with executives over the terms of their compensation.  Under this view, optimal 
                                                 
23
 A third view is that corporate law issues are better explained as a team production problem rather than a 
traditional principal-agent problem.  See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).  Under the team production view, the board of directors serves as a 
mediating hierarch between stakeholders (executives, employees, creditors) who make firm-specific investments in 
the company.  Id. at 276-87.  This theory predicts that compensation arrangements would not be designed to 
maximize shareholder value, but to balance the interests of the stakeholders.  Id. at 285-87.   
24
 See, e.g., Core et al, supra note 3, at 27. 
25
 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 2, at 308-09. 
26
 Core et al, supra note 3, at 29-33; Frydman & Jenter, supra note 3, at 88-89. 
27
 Core et al, supra note 3, at 33.  
28
 Id.  Typically, compensatory stock becomes unrestricted or “vests” somewhere from 1 to 5 years following grant.  
If the executive’s employment is terminated prior to vesting, the stock generally must be returned.  See FREDERICK 
W. COOK & CO., THE 2009 TOP 250: LONG-TERM INCENTIVE GRANT PRACTICES FOR EXECUTIVES (2009). 
29
 More generally, companies face a tradeoff in compensating executives.  They want to provide high-powered 
incentives to encourage the executives to work hard and to take on appropriately risky projects, but compensation 
arrangements have to be mutually acceptable and non-diversified executives discount risky, high powered pay 
instruments.  Thus, while option compensation may mitigate risk aversion concerns, it may be expensive to pay 
executives with options.  Walker, supra note 3, at 247. 
30
 There are other explanations.  There is little doubt that accounting and tax rules have influenced the use and the 
design of option compensation.  See, e.g., David I. Walker & Victor Fleischer, Book/Tax Conformity and Equity 
Compensation, 62 TAX L. REV. 399, 403-12 (2009). 
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arrangements could arise as a result of competitive pressures exerted by markets for capital, 
products, labor, or even corporate control.   
 Under the alternative managerial power view, executive pay arrangements are not simply 
a means of combatting agency costs; these arrangements also reflect agency costs.31  The 
managerial power story begins with the observation that many features of executive 
compensation arrangements appear to be inconsistent with a share value maximizing model.32  
The managerial power view posits that executive pay practices do not uniformly reflect vigorous 
bargaining and that executives exert more influence over the terms of their pay than would be 
expected in an arm’s length bargaining situation.  Further, under this view, pressures from 
competitive markets for capital, products, labor, and corporate control are seen as insufficient to 
significantly constrain executive pay, which, even when outlandish, tends to represent a small 
fraction of costs for a large, public corporation.33 
The threat or reality of investor and financial press outrage plays an important role in 
disciplining executive compensation under the managerial power view.34  The idea is that 
executives and outside directors bear personal costs when these constituencies become outraged 
over pay levels or pay practices.  In order to minimize outrage, executives and their boards seek 
out low salience channels of compensation and other means of camouflaging compensation.  The 
result under the managerial power view is that public company executives receive both more pay 
and different forms of pay than they would in a well-functioning market, all of which is costly 
for shareholders. 
Prior theory has not specified exactly the mechanism of action for the outrage constraint.  
One possible view is that outrage comprises a set of social sanctions on managers who extract 
excessive rents: The firm is a cooperative enterprise, and participants impose largely intangible 
punishment on those whom they know to be violating the implicit cooperative norm.35  Or, more 
broadly, managers may face judgment from their friends and peers for violating social norms.  A 
third possibility is that outrage represents latent action on the part of other stakeholders, action 
that could be motivated by emotion or ideology.  The literature on collective action reports that 
emotional and ideological commitment often are key factors in groups that successfully 
                                                 
31
 Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 784. 
32
 Id. at 795--834. 
33
 Id. at 774--79. 
34
 Id. at 786--88. 
35
 Cf. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 35-
37, 88-89, 205-07 (1990) (describing use of norms in the informal governance of shared resources). We note that 
punishment may, but need not, be related to the efficacy of the manager’s pay structure as a system for incentivizing 
maximum returns to stakeholders.  Participants may also have preferences for the distribution of firm profits that do 
not align perfectly with the distributionally-neutral optimal incentive structure.   
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overcome free riding.36  Managers would then aim to avoid “outrage” as a way of ensuring that 
their principals continue to monitor only loosely.     
 Evidence supporting the managerial power theory of the executive pay setting process in 
the public company setting is largely indirect.  For example, we observe that executives and 
boards camouflage compensation by emphasizing relatively opaque pay channels such as 
deferred compensation37 or backdated stock options,38 and we infer that they do so to minimize 
outrage over pay levels.  Some commentators have argued that insufficient pay for performance 
sensitivity39 or a lack of relative performance evaluation40 undermines the persuasiveness of the 
optimal contracting theory, but others remain unconvinced.41 
 The totality of the evidence does not support any single theoretical framework regarding 
executive compensation in the for-profit sector.  It seems likely, in fact, that the optimal 
contracting and managerial power views co-exist, providing relatively more or less explanatory 
power at particular companies. 
B. The Conventional View of Nonprofit Executive Pay in Theory and Practice 
 In contrast, commentators generally agree that excessive pay is not a serious concern in 
the nonprofit sector, and U.S. law largely reflects that consensus.  A recent economics text on 
nonprofit governance quotes approvingly another author’s observation that “boards should not 
necessarily invest in . . . mechanisms … to curb…CEO pay excesses.”42  Intellectual leaders in 
both compensation design and nonprofits, ranging from incentive-pay godfathers Fama and 
Jensen to Susan Rose-Ackerman and Burton Weisbrod, have made similar claims.43   
                                                 
36
 See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 108--12 (1982); Lise Vesterlund, Why Do People Give?, in THE 
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 568, 569—78 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 
2006); David Knoke, Incentives in Collective Action Organizations, 53 AM. SOC. REV. 311, 326 (1988). 
37
 Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 7, at 831 (suggesting that opaque deferred compensation arrangements might be 
attractive as a means of reducing the salience of compensation, even if the arrangements are inefficient). 
38
 David I. Walker, Unpacking Backdating: Economic Analysis and Observations on the Stock Option Scandal, 87 
B.U. L. REV. 561, 603 (2007) (“It is hard to imagine more thoroughly camouflaged compensation than secretly 
backdated options whose value far exceeds that reported to shareholders.”). 
39
 Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 
227 (1990) (arguing that evidence of minimal pay for performance sensitivity in CEO contracts is “inconsistent with 
the implications of formal agency models of optimal contracting”). 
40
 Alfred Rappaport, New Thinking on How to Link Executive Pay with Performance, 77 HARV. BUS. REV. 91, 92--
94 (1999) (“The huge gains from options for below-average performers should give pause to even the most ardent 
defender of current corporate pay systems.”); cf. Bengt R. Holmström, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 
324, 334--38 (1982) (explaining the importance of relative performance evaluation in overcoming moral hazard in 
the corporate setting). 
41
 Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q. J. ECON., 653, 653--56 
(1998) (finding increased pay for performance sensitivity that undermines the view that CEOs are paid like 
bureaucrats); see also Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive Compensation, 14 TAX POL’Y 
& ECON. 7 (2000); George P. Baker & Brian J. Hall, CEO Incentives and Firm Size, 22 J. LABOR ECON. 767 (2004); 
Core et al, supra note 3. 
42
 JEGERS, supra note 14, at 46 (quoting Jobome, supra note 14, at 350). 
43
 See sources cited supra note 14. 
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 These authors argue that self-selection, ideological alignment with donors, and 
“stewardship” constrain rent-seeking by managers at nonprofit organizations.44 If managers 
know that cash compensation is typically lower at nonprofits, individuals who accept the job will 
be those who are less motivated by cash.45  Instead, commentators argue, nonprofit managers are 
motivated primarily by a drive to help others, or otherwise to fulfill some ideological mission.46  
Taking cash from the organization would diminish its capacity to accomplish its goals, which the 
manager presumably shares.47  And managers at nonprofits may be “stewards,” that is, the kind 
of people who prefer to sacrifice (or at least be perceived as sacrificing) on behalf of others.48      
 Scholars recognize that nonprofits suffer from managerial agency problems that are 
similar to those observed in the for-profit sector, but they argue that fact supports their views on 
managerial pay.  As in the case of public companies, large nonprofits are characterized by a 
separation of ownership from control.49  The separation is even more severe, as nonprofits lack 
several control mechanisms, such as the pressure of shareholder voting or exit, that for-profits 
can employ.50  As a result, managers have a great deal of freedom to run the organization as they 
please.  If so, however, they may have less of an incentive to extract excess compensation from 
the organization; the money is essentially under their control either way.51  
  These theories, though popular, have not been subjected to much empirical testing. 
Jobome argues, on the basis of a survey of U.K. nonprofits, that he finds evidence in support of 
this  hypothesis, though it would be more accurate as a statistical matter to say that he fails to 
find evidence rejecting it.52  Other authors have claimed, based on findings that link presidential 
compensation to “quality” measures such as U.S. News Ranking, that “agency theory is 
working” --- that is, presidents are faithful agents of their principals.53  But the fact that better 
managers are paid more does not rule out the possibility that all managers are paid too much.  
Similarly, findings that for-profit managers on average earn more than their nonprofit counter-
                                                 
44
 See sources cited supra note14. 
45
 Caers et al., supra note14, at 31; Femida Handy & Eliakim Katz, The Wage Differential Between Nonprofit 
Institutions and Corporations: Getting More by Paying Less?, 26 J. COMPARATIVE ECON. 246, 249--50 (1998). 
46
 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Ideals Versus Dollars: Donors, Charity Managers and Government Grants, 95 J. POL. 
ECON. 810, 812 (1987).   
47
 JEGERS, supra note14, at 45; see Rose-Ackerman, supra note14, at 719--20 (arguing that managers trade off cash 
pay for ability to achieve ideological goals).   
48
 van Puyvelde et al., supra note14, at 436. 
49
 Fama & Jensen, Separation, supra note 14, at 308--10, 319. 
50
 See sources cited supra note 13. 
51
 JEGERS, supra note 13, at 45; see Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13, at 719--20. 
52
 Jobome, supra note 14, at 350--51.  That is, he cannot distinguish the effect he measures from zero.  But Jobome 
does nothing to rule out “Type II error” --- the fact that his methods did not unearth a relationship does not prove its 
absence.     
53
 Thomas Li-Peng Tang et al., Factors Related to University Presidents’ Pay: An Examination of Private Colleges 
and Universities, 39 HIGHER EDUC. 393, 411 (2000). 
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parts tell us only that nonprofit managers do value some aspect of their jobs, and not whether 
they also take opportunities to award themselves more cash when possible.54   
Nonprofit governance in the real world mirrors academic views in taking a highly laissez-
faire view of executive pay.  State attorneys general have responsibility for nonprofit oversight, 
including oversight of  executive compensation.55  But AGs are subject to their own agency 
problems and resource constraints, and most AG offices have scant resources for the number of 
organizations nominally under their supervision.56  Even if AGs were energetic and attentive, 
courts grant almost complete deference to board compensation decisions, unless those decisions 
are the result of blatant conflicts of interest.57   
Another possible limitation is built into the federal tax code.  Under IRC § 501(c)(3), “no 
part of the net earnings” of a tax-exempt charitable organization may “inure[] to the benefit of 
any private shareholder or individual.”58  Thus, while the law permits paying a public company 
executive a portion of firm earnings as an incentive, such an arrangement is largely off-limits in 
the nonprofit sector.59  Private inurement rules also prohibit managers from taking home 
compensation in excess of fair market value, since that might represent a disguised form of profit 
distribution.60 
Of course, nonprofit executives must be paid a competitive wage.  The difficulty lies in 
distinguishing between competitive compensation, which is allowed, and “excess benefit 
transactions” that represent forbidden private inurement.  Since 2002, this line has largely been 
policed by the “intermediate sanctions” rules of the tax code.61  Under these rules, significant 
financial penalties can be imposed on nonprofit executives and directors who engage in “excess 
benefit transactions,” which include the provision of excessive executive pay.62   
                                                 
54
 See JEGERS, supra note 14, at 43--44, for a review. 
55MARION FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND 
REGULATION 54 (2004). 
56
 Manne, supra note 13, at 250--51; see Frumkin & Clark, supra note 12, at 441--47 (setting out reasons for limited 
efficacy of AG oversight of pay); Mark Sidel, The Nonprofit Sector and the New State Activism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
1312, 1334--35 (2002) (reviewing NORMAN I. SILBER, A CORPORATE FORM OF FREEDOM: THE EMERGENCE OF THE 
NONPROFIT SECTOR (2001)). 
57
 FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 55, at 209--10. 
58
 However, firms are allowed to provide some limited incentives to executives, as long as the incentive is not the 
equivalent of a share of profits.  James R. Hines, Jr. et al., The Attack on Nonprofit Status: A Charitable Assessment, 
108 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1193--96 (2010). 
59
 GCM 39674 (Jul 29, 1992) (holding that profit-sharing arrangements for physicians at nonprofit hospitals were 
not per se illegal but would be scrutinized closely by the IRS). 
60
 Frumkin & Clark, supra note 12, at 467. 
61
 IRC § 4958; Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1.  These sanctions are described as “intermediate” in the sense that they are 
less draconian than revoking a nonprofit organization’s tax-exempt status.  For a thorough overview of the 
intermediate sanctions regime, see Carly B. Eisenberg & Kevin Outterson, Agents Without Principals: Regulating 
the Duty of Loyalty for Nonprofit Corporations Through the Intermediate Sanctions Tax Regulations, 5 J. BUS. L. & 
ENTREP. 243, 251--70 (2012). 
62
 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1, -4(b)(1)(ii). 
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While the intermediate sanctions rules strongly encourage nonprofits to follow certain 
procedures in setting executive pay, they are unlikely to provide significant discipline on the 
substance of these awards.63  The rules offer a safe harbor for nearly all compensation packages 
awarded by well-advised boards.  The rules include a rebuttable presumption that transactions, 
including awards of pay, are not excess benefit transactions if 1) they are approved in advance by 
a nonprofit board or committee composed of individuals who have no conflict of interest, 2) the 
board or committee obtained and relied on appropriate data in determining pay, and 3) the board 
or committee adequately documented the basis for its decision.64  If these criteria are met, the 
burden shifts to the IRS to show that a pay grant was an excess benefit transaction.65  
Organizations can defend their award by pointing to pay in similar for-profit industries, and first-
time contracts are exempt from any excess-benefit scrutiny at all.66       
Nonetheless, the ban on private inurement, which Henry Hansmann termed the “non-
distribution constraint,”67 may constrain executive pay for two reasons.  First, the rule may create 
a norm in favor of restrained compensation in the nonprofit sector.  Second, the rule bars the use 
of certain compensation tools that might result in high compensation.  One of the explanations 
for the dramatic increase in public company executive pay in the 1990s was the shift into stock 
option compensation that coincided with a decade long boom in the stock market.68  Analysts 
continue to debate whether the relationship was a causal one,69 but the point is that a similar 
circumstance could not arise in the nonprofit world given the IRC § 501(c)(3) prohibition against 
private inurement.         
II.  Towards a Theory of Managerial Power in the Nonprofit Sector 
 In our view these accounts of nonprofit executive compensation are too optimistic.  In 
this part we’ll argue that, while money may not be the only thing that matters to nonprofit 
managers, it still is an important piece of their total rewards.  Further, drawing on insights from 
the existing managerial power literature, we will argue that stakeholder outrage is likely to 
constrain nonprofit executive pay in such a way as to explain variations in compensation 
between seemingly similar organizations.  This literature also suggests ways in which our 
hypothesis could be tested empirically.  Finally, in Part II.C., we discuss these general points in 
the specific context of colleges and universities. 
                                                 
63
 Jill S. Manny, Nonprofit Payments to Insiders and Outsiders: Is the Sky the Limit?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 736 
(2007).  
64
 Id. § 53.4958-6(a). 
65
 Id. § 53.4958-6(b). 
66
 Id. § 53.4958-4(a)(3), (b)(1)(ii). 
67
 Hansmann, supra note 13, at 838. 
68
 Frydman & Jenter, supra note 4, at 76. 
69
 See Walker, supra note 4, at 235--36, for a review. 
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A.  What Matters to Nonprofit Managers? 
 While nonprofit managers may highly value mission, ideology, or prestige, powerful 
empirical evidence suggests that they also value money.  With rare exceptions, executives even 
of the noblest charities do not work for free.  Many organizations pay cash bonuses, and several 
studies find some evidence of “pay for performance” in the nonprofit sector---managers who do 
a good job are paid more.70  These data points, too, imply that managers are motivated by money 
(or at least that the boards who set their pay think they are).   
 The question, then, is not whether managers would like to be paid more, but rather what 
higher pay would cost them.  As we just noted, some commentators argue that a manager might 
prefer to leave funds in the organization, since she controls those funds and uses them to achieve 
her personal goals.71  We think this is unlikely at nonprofits of any meaningful size.  The 
marginal contribution of a dollar to the organization’s outputs will be very small relative to its 
contribution to the manager’s utility.  That is, a million dollars is not going to move a university 
from Beach Bum State to Elite U, but that same million would dramatically transform the life of 
a president previously earning $100,000 per year.  Further, the quality of the organization’s 
output is a public good shared among the stakeholders; if the manager is a rational self-
maximizer, she should typically prefer to free ride on the contributions of others.72 
 Higher compensation may also cost the manager some reward from “warm glow.”  
Presumably, managers are willing to give up some cash, despite the factors we just identified, 
because they derive some offsetting value, or “warm glow,” from the act of donation.73  As we 
noted, part of the manager’s satisfaction from doing her job may be the approval of peers or 
others.  Game theory and evolutionary biology, among other disciplines, offer explanations for 
why humans might admire and reward our self-sacrificing colleagues.74  Managers who value 
these rewards might lose some of them if they are observed to draw a large paycheck.75  Of 
course, lower pay is not necessarily the only answer; high pay that is opaque to outside eyes is 
another.   
                                                 
70
 See Hines, Jr. et al., supra note 58, at 1194--98 . 
71
 See sources cited supra note 47. 
72
 In some public goods settings, free ridership is lower because one or a few contributors can make 
disproportionately large contributions (leaving them with little free riding opportunity, and other contributors with a 
large value for a small contribution), see Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13, at 713, but this would not be the case for 
one employee in a large firm.   
73
 See Fama & Jensen, Agency Costs, supra note 14, at 344; see Laura Leete, Work in the Nonprofit Sector, in THE 
NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 159, 159--65, for a review and Brian Galle, Keep 
Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1223 (2010) for more extended discussion. 
74
 See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, The Nature of Human Altruism, 425 NATURE 785, 785--91 (2003); David 
G. Rand et al., Direct Reciprocity with Costly Punishment: Generous Tit-for-Tat Prevails, 256 J. THEORETICAL 
BIOL. 45, 45--57 (2009).  
75
 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13, at 714 (noting donors may lose value of giving if others perceive their actions 
as overly self-serving). 
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 Lastly, cash is tax-disfavored relative to warm glow or other rewards of leaving money in 
the organization.  Employees are taxed on cash or in-kind compensation, but generally not on 
psychic benefits.76  At a for-profit firm, reducing cash pay in favor of psychic benefits is tax-
favored for the employee, but tax-disfavored for the employer, which loses out on its deduction 
for the costs of compensation.77  Nonprofit employers are usually tax exempt, and so exchanging 
cash for psychic benefits would be wholly tax favorable.   
 If managers had complete control over their compensation structure, their pay would 
represent a pure balancing among these factors.78  Assuming a diminishing marginal value of 
cash, diminishing returns to making a charitable contribution, and a decreasing marginal tax 
benefit to warm glow compensation (since the employee’s marginal tax rate on cash declines 
when she substitutes warm glow for cash), we should expect managers optimally to select a mix 
of cash and other rewards.  Few managers will starve or live under a bridge in order to earn 
warm glow, but those that value warm glow will take some degree of pay cut to earn it.   
 The pay structures preferred by organizations may not match the manager’s, giving rise 
to incentives for managerial opportunism.  To take the simplest example, the organization may 
have some bargaining power and may offer the manager a total award of combined cash and 
glow that is less than her optimal level.  Since she can’t easily extract additional warm glow from 
the organization, her only alternative is take opportunities to award herself more cash.   
Similarly, other stakeholders may have preferences for a different mix of compensation.  
Outside donors, too, may be motivated by warm glow.79  Donors’ glow could depend on the 
manager’s pay:  Will outsiders perceive the donor as noble if her money goes to pay for the 
president’s private jet?  Assuming the pay package the organization offers reflects donor 
preferences to some degree, the manager will again have incentives to move closer to her 
personal optimum by extracting additional cash from the organization.    
 In sum, even managers who are strongly motivated by their nonprofit mission also have 
need for, and often incentive to acquire, additional cash. So they have motive, what about means 
and opportunity?  
B.  What Constrains the Compensation of Nonprofit Managers? 
 A modest reading of the standard literature on nonprofit executive pay would be that pay 
is lower in this sector because of manager self-selection and the warm glow enjoyed by 
                                                 
76
 WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 68 (14th ed. 2006). 
77
 Absent an explicit expenditure, simply providing a warm glow to an employee would not generate a deduction for 
an ordinary and necessary business expense.  IRC § 162(a). 
78
 See Handy & Katz, supra note 45, at 258--59, and Ann Preston, The Nonprofit Worker in a For-Profit World, 7 J. 
LABOR ECON. 438, 442 (1989) for formal models of how firms and managers choose between mixes of pure cash vs. 
cash plus fringe benefits and amenities.   
79
 Lise Vesterlund, Why Do People Give?, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 
568, 572; James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 
ECON. J. 464, 464-65 (1990). 
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managers and other stakeholders.  We do not dispute such a modest claim, but we argue that 
monetary compensation matters as well, that monetary compensation is significant, and that 
managerial agency theory, specifically, the managerial power theory, can help explain the 
variation in cash compensation and benefits received by managers of various nonprofits. 
We would argue that many of the factors that lead to managerial power in the for-profit 
setting apply as strongly, if not more so, in nonprofits.  As in public companies, boards of 
directors or trustees are charged with negotiating nonprofit executive pay.80  These boards are 
likely to be relatively weak and the executives relatively strong with respect to the pay setting 
process, and other matters, for the same reasons that public company boards are weak and 
executives strong.  First, nonprofit trustees are part-timers who typically spend a small fraction 
of their time exercising oversight over the organization, while the full time executives set the 
agenda and control the flow of information to the trustees.81  Second, the trustees are not 
spending their own money when they negotiate executive pay.  In fact, while public company 
directors are increasingly compensated with equity,82 which may encourage them to think and act 
more like owners, nonprofit trustees can have no direct economic interest in their 
organizations.83  Third, as in the case of public company directors, nonprofit trustees are likely to 
be bound to the senior executives through various formal and informal ties that encourage a 
culture of deference to the executives.84  Other stakeholders rarely have both incentives and 
resources to closely monitor executive pay.85   
                                                 
80
 ROBERT J. DESIDERIO, PLANNING TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS §2A.02 (Rel. 10 2011). 
81
 James J. Fishman, Standards of Conduct for Directors of Nonprofit Corporations, 7 PACE L. REV. 389, 397 
(1987); cf. Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 772 (describing impact of similar dynamic at for-profit firms). 
82
 Frydman & Jenter, supra note 4, at 76. 
83
 Hansmann, supra note 13, at 838.  Nonprofit firms may but usually do not offer directors simple salary or other 
non-proprietary compensation.  See Maureen Glabman, The Future of Voluntary Governance, HOSP. & HEALTH 
NETWORKS, Sept. 2006, at 68 (noting scarcity of compensated board members in nonprofit sector). 
84
 See Brian G. M. Main, Charles A. O’Reilly III, & James Wade, The CEO, the Board of Directors, and Executive 
Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 11 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 293 (1995) (for-profits); 
Avner Ben-Ner & T. Van Hoomissen, The Governance of Nonprofit Organizations: Law and Public Policy, 4 
NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 393, 404--05 (1994) (nonprofits); Danne L. Johnson, Seeking Meaningful 
Nonprofit Reform in a Post Sarbanes-Oxley World, 54 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 187, 203--04 (“It is not unusual for the 
incestuous director relationship, common in the for-profit sector, to be replicated on nonprofit boards….”).  These 
close relationships may also affect the psychological and cognitive pathways that lead to effective governance.  
Melanie Leslie, The Wisdom of Crowds? Groupthink and Nonprofit Governance, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1179, 1189--1210 
(2010). 
Although the intermediate sanctions rules discussed above essentially require that nonprofit directors that 
approve executive pay not have a conflict of interest, that standard insures only a very modest degree of 
independence.  Efforts to increase outside director independence in the for-profit sector, such as by removing inside 
directors from board nominating committees, generally have not carried over to the nonprofit sector.  IRS 
regulations do reward board independence in certain situations, using independence as a plus factor in the 
determination of public charity status (see Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)), but for many nonprofits, such as the institutions 
of higher education that are the focus of this study, public charity status is automatic (see IRC § 509(a)(1)) and thus 
this lever is unimportant.   
85
 Frumkin & Clark, supra note 12, at 461--62, 482. 
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 In fact, the separation is more severe in the nonprofit sector.  At public companies, it is 
generally possible for a party to accumulate a sufficient number of shares to gain control, and 
this possibility places some upper bound on agency costs.86  In the nonprofit sector, there is no 
market for organizational control, and no such upper bound. 87  Further, the absence of a market 
for organizational control reduces board and managerial incentives to achieve maximal cost 
effectiveness.88  This can be a benefit, since charity is rarely just about the bottom line.  But it 
does mean that pressure to reduce compensation and other costs is rather lower.     
Though these traditional mechanisms are weak, we would argue that the threat or reality 
of what Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker term “outrage” could play an important role in disciplining 
the pay of nonprofit executives.   Like their for-profit counterparts, nonprofit managers and 
board members may experience personal costs if others believe that the manager receives 
excessive compensation.  By definition nonprofit organizations do not share a cooperative 
venture with investors, but they do have donors, beneficiaries or customers, and employees. 
Nonprofit managers and trustees are also likely to be particularly sensitive to more 
general social perception of their pay.  Again, to the extent that “warm glow” is an important 
component of the manager’s compensation, she pays a price for disappointing the public.   
Lastly, nonprofit managers may be constrained by latent stakeholder responses to higher 
reported pay.  Warm glow is an important motive for donors.89  If donors’ attachment to the 
nonprofit is diminished by emotional or ideological disappointment in its leader’s pay, donations 
may fall, leaving the manager with fewer resources available to pursue her own goals.90  As a 
result, nonprofit boards are rightly concerned “that raising [executive] salaries could tarnish a 
group’s public image.”91     
                                                 
86
 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 2; Henry G. Manne, Bring Back the Hostile Takeover, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2002. 
87
 Fama & Jensen, Separation, supra note 14, at 319; Rodrigues, supra note 13, at 1268--69.  Potentially, if large 
donors tend to be granted seats on the board of directors, there may be something like a slow-motion market for 
corporate control, in that outsiders can potentially purchase the ability to direct the firm.  Eleanor Brown & Al 
Slivinski, Nonprofit Organizations and the Market, in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra 
note 36, at 140, 154.  But there is no opportunity for a hostile takeover; an existing board can simply refuse to seat 
new board members who would diminish their control.   
88
 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13, at 712. 
89
 See sources cited supra note 79. 
90
 Cf. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 14, at 714, 719 (noting that if donors’ emotional rewards from giving decline so 
do gifts, and that managers’ signal of ideological commitment may be important to donors).  The role of the press in 
this story is unclear.  The press may serve simply as an intermediary – the means by which information is passed to 
the stakeholders who express approbation or disapprobation – or the press may contribute more directly to an 
outrage constraint if managers are sensitive to adverse press coverage independent of its impact on donors, 
employees, and other stakeholders. 
91
 Sharon M. Oster, Executive Compensation in the Nonprofit Sector, 8 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 207, 219 
(1998) (quoting nonprofit compensation consultant, Leonard Pfeifer); see Dennis R. Young, Executive Leadership in 
Nonprofit Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR --A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 167--79 (stating 
that donors expect nonprofit managers to partially volunteer their efforts). 
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Anecdotal evidence supports the notion that nonprofit executives and boards are sensitive 
to the perception of their pay practices.92  Like their for-profit brethren, nonprofit executives 
often receive a considerable portion of their total compensation in less visible forms, such as 
deferred compensation and perquisites.93  Moreover, some nonprofit executives receive only a 
portion of their compensation directly from their employer with the balance coming from an 
outside foundation.94  Aside from camouflaging total compensation, it is difficult to imagine 
what purpose is served by splitting compensation in this way.95   
Our claims about the importance of outrage as a constraint on nonprofit pay lead us to a 
testable hypothesis.  Nonprofit organizations subject to greater actual or potential “outrage” 
should pay less, all else equal.  In the next two sections, we describe how institutional 
differences are likely to lead to differences in the outrage constraint.  In Part III, we will test 
whether these differences do indeed result in differences in pay.   
C. Outrage Constraints and the Example of Colleges and Universities  
The nonprofit sector seems a promising place to search for variation in outrage 
constraints.  As noted above, evidence from the for-profit sector of the managerial power theory 
and the impact of an outrage constraint is largely inferential – we see that executives and boards 
camouflage compensation and deduce that they do so to minimize outrage – but there are few, if 
any, differences between firms in a particular subsector (say manufacturing or utilities) that 
would have a predictable and testable impact on the outrage constraint and thus pay levels at 
various firms.  By contrast, there are several factors at play in nonprofits (and absent or of less 
significance in the for-profit sector) that should have a differential impact on the outrage 
constraint from organization to organization and that may provide more compelling evidence of 
the existence and scope of that constraint. 
Several commentators have observed that the public expects leaders of charitable 
organizations to be paid less than their for-profit peers.96  Referring to the comments section of 
its webpage, Charity Navigator notes that “many donors assume that charity leaders work for 
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 Kertz, supra note 12, at 820. 
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 ROBERT H. ATWELL & JANE V. WELLMAN, PRESIDENTIAL COMPENSATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION: POLICIES AND 
BEST PRACTICES (2000); Kertz, supra note 12, at 865--66; Wendy K. Szymanski, An Allegory of Good (and Bad) 
Governance: Applying the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Nonprofit Organizations, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1303, 1323--24 
(noting loans with favorable terms are common in nonprofit compensation). 
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 Julianne Basinger & Sarah Henderson, Hidden Costs of High Public Pay, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 14, 
2003; Ronald G. Ehrenberg et al., Paying Our Presidents: What Do Trustees Value?, 25 REV. HIGHER EDUC. 15, 17 
(2001); see Charity Navigator, 2012 CEO Compensation Study 16 (Nov. 2012), available at 
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 Some state institutions reportedly rely on compensation from multiple sources to avoid state-law caps on public 
employee salaries.  Basinger & Henderson, supra note 70.  But there is no comparable explanation for the practice 
among private entities.  
It also is possible that executives are concealing pay from employees as well as or rather than donors.  Wage equity 
reportedly is important to worker motivation in the nonprofit sector.  Leete, supra note 73, at 164.  
96
 R. Herzlinger, Effective Oversight: A Guide for Nonprofit Donors, HARV. BUS. REV., July 1994, at 52.  
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free or minimal pay and are shocked to see that they earn six figure salaries.”97  It is not clear, 
however, that the public considers private colleges and universities to be in the same category as 
more innately charitable organizations, such as churches and relief agencies, even though all of 
these organizations are lumped together as “public charities” under the tax code. 
In particular, outrage might depend on the nature of the nonprofit’s mission.  Observers 
likely expect greater self-sacrifice from employees at organizations with clear-cut spiritual or 
public service missions, such as churches and relief organizations; nonprofits with large revenues 
and many paying customers may look more “commercial” and therefore carry an expectation of 
something like market salaries.98  Alternately, Usha Rodrigues argues that because customers of 
service-providing nonprofits can draw on their own direct observations and the reports of peers, 
the need for and expectation of “signals” of charitable status are less important for those 
entities.99  Unfortunately, it is not feasible to test for the impact of an outrage constraint across 
nonprofit subsectors.  It is not practical to separate the impact of the outrage constraint from 
other factors that would differentially impact pay levels across subsectors (e.g., higher levels of 
pay for nonprofit hospital executives resulting from higher pay levels enjoyed by for-profit 
hospital executives).   
Thus, while we suspect that the managerial power view and the outrage constraint help to 
explain the pay setting process at U.S. nonprofits generally, the focus in this Article is on the 
compensation of the leaders in one particular nonprofit subsector – private colleges and 
universities.  We choose higher education because it comprises a large portion of the nonprofit 
sector, because the variation in mission among different institutions provides a version of the 
ideal study outlined in the last paragraph, and because of the ready availability of relevant data.   
We focus on private colleges and universities for two reasons.  First, as discussed below, 
we have managed to collect a wealth of data on the compensation of private college and 
university presidents, donations, and various important control variables.  Second, and more 
importantly, the agency problem at public and private universities is different.  While both 
private and public university heads typically report to a board of trustees, in the private 
university sphere, the chain of command ends there.  Private university boards are self-
replicating and/or include members elected by alumni.100  Either way, there is a great deal of 
independence.  Many public university trustees are selected by state governors and other political 
actors.101  Moreover, public universities are often organized into a state system.  The head of the 
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 Charity Navigator, supra note 94, at 1. 
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 Hansmann, supra note 13, at 876; see Daniel Shaviro, Assessing the “Contract Failure” Explanation for 
Nonprofit Organizations and Their Tax-Exempt Status, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1001, 1003--04 (1997) (suggesting 
that warm glow motive is more likely in non-commercial firms).  This is not to suggest that outrage would play no 
role in the pay-setting process at nonprofit hospitals, only that the effect would be similar to that observed in the for-
profit world where warm glow is totally absent. 
99
 Rodrigues, supra note 13, at 1293--1303. 
100
 James O. Freedman, Presidents and Trustees, in GOVERNING ACADEMIA 9, 13 (Ronald G. Ehrenberg ed., 2005). 
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 Donald E. Heller, State Governance of Academia, in GOVERNING ACADEMIA, supra note 100, at 49, 53. 
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state system, rather than the president of a particular university, may be the most senior 
executive within the system.  In some cases, the publicly-funded compensation of public 
university presidents is capped under state law.102  Even where pay is not formally capped, it 
may be limited by the realities of state budgeting processes.  At bottom, a public university 
president is a government official, not an autonomous head of an independent institution.103 
In a 2007 study, James Monks found that public university presidents earned about 50% 
less than their counterparts at comparable private universities.104  Monks suggested that the 
difference might be explained by different skill sets required in the two jobs.  Public university 
presidents need to be skilled at managing state appropriation processes, while private university 
presidents need to be expert at attracting private donations.  Another explanation, however, 
would be that the agency problem is more severe in the non-governmental nonprofit sector, at 
least to the extent of university president pay.  State law, appropriations processes, or university 
system administration may be more effective at restraining compensation of particular university 
presidents than an independent board of trustees. 
D. Testable Implications of the Outrage Constraint at Private Colleges and 
Universities 
What then are the possible sources of outrage variation across colleges and universities?    
We see four primary sets of differences, which will form the focus of the empirical analysis that 
follows. 
1.  Religious Affiliation   
Although religious affiliation may have little or no impact on the scope or demands of an 
executive’s job, consistent with the previous discussion, observers may feel that the head of a 
college with a religious affiliation should be paid at a relatively low level.  They may feel that 
the charitable nature of the organization should extend to its senior management.  At one level, 
we would simply expect a more strongly negative visceral reaction to the announcement that the 
president of a religiously affiliated college received $1 million in pay than we would to the same 
announcement with respect to the president of an otherwise identical secular college.  At a 
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 See, e.g., FLA. STAT., Title 48, ch. 1012.975(2) (“a state university president may not receive more than $225,000 
in remuneration annually from public funds”).  The Florida legislature has not restricted university president salary 
funding from other sources.  Id. at 1012.975(3) (“section does not prohibit any party from providing cash or cash-
equivalent compensation from funds that are not public funds”). 
103
 For evidence on the role of politics in setting public university budgets, see Robert C. Lowry, The Effects of State 
Political Interests and Campus Outputs on Public University Revenues, 20 ECON. OF EDUC. REV. 105, 117--18 
(2001); see also Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Econometric Studies of Higher Education, 121 J. ECONOMETRICS 19, 28--29 
(2004), for a brief review of other studies. 
104
 James Monks, Public Versus Private University President Pay Levels and Structure, 26 ECON. OF EDUC. REV. 
338, 345 (2007).  Because total compensation was inconsistently reported, Monks analyzed university president 
salaries rather than total compensation.  Id. at 341.  It is conceivable that some of the gap in salary was offset by 
other benefits.  However, Monks found that presidents tended to move from public to private institutions and not in 
the reverse direction, id. at 342, 347--48, which suggests that the total package of benefits (pay, benefits, prestige, 
etc) was greater in the private university sphere.   
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deeper level, the theory here is that donors to “commercial” nonprofits are more likely to simply 
be customers purchasing a product, while donors to organizations with a clearer ideological 
mission will derive a greater measure of utility from the “warm glow” of giving.105  Customers 
purchasing a product may view high pay simply as a signal of quality.  In contrast, high pay can 
diminish the warm glow of giving by contradicting donors’ distributive or other ideological 
preferences, and by undermining the social consensus that the organization is “noble” or 
“worthy”; if insiders won’t sacrifice on behalf of the organization, that could be taken as a signal 
that less-informed supporters shouldn’t, either.106   
In sum, we would expect the outrage constraint to be set at a relatively lower level and to 
result in relatively lower executive pay at organizations with a religious affiliation.  To be sure, 
though, there would be competing explanations, such as self-selection, for a finding of a negative 
association between religious affiliation and pay levels.107 
2.  Exposure to Current Donations 
Private colleges and universities receive funds from operations, government grants, 
donations, and other sources; and relative dependence on these sources varies.108  Again, we 
expect that because donors are more motivated by “warm glow,” they are generally more 
sensitive to perceived excess executive pay than are other revenue providers, such as customers 
(students and parents) or grant-making agencies.109  At least under our first and third theories of 
“outrage,” differences in schools’ sources of funding should differentially impact compensation.  
If outrage consists of social sanctions from other stakeholders, or represents the threat of more 
tangible latent stakeholder action, executives of schools (and their boards) that are relatively 
more exposed to potential outrage on the part of current donors because current donations make 
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 See Rodrigues, supra note 13, at 1295 (noting that religious hospitals may rely more on charitable signaling 
because it could provide them additional benefits not available to secular competitors).  See Andreoni, supra note 
65, at 494--98, for a general discussion of warm glow motives in giving. 
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 See GERALD MARWELL & PAMELA OLIVER, THE CRITICAL MASS IN COLLECTIVE ACTION: A MICRO-SOCIAL 
THEORY 7--9 (1993) (introducing authors’ claim that organizations overcome free rider problems through mutual 
signaling of commitment, among other factors). 
107
 For examination of the possibility that different pay structures in the nonprofit sector attract employees with 
different sets of motivations, see Anne E. Preston, Women in the White-Collar Nonprofit Sector: The Best Option or 
the Only Option?, 72 REV. ECON. & STATS. 560, 564 (1990).  For more general discussion of the importance of 
workplace amenities in sorting workers into different jobs, including in the religious employer context, see Jonah 
Gelbach et al., Passive Discrimination: When Does it Make Sense to Pay Too Little?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 800--
22 (2009).  
108
 If nonprofit line employees substitute “warm glow” for salary, as others have suggested, see Henderson & 
Malani, supra note 13, at 583--84, they are in effect donors to the firm and should be sensitive to executive pay in 
the same way. 
109
 See Caers et al., supra note 44, at 39--40 (noting that donor outrage could constrain executive pay).  Hansmann, 
supra note 13, at 843--68, suggests that all purchasers of services from a firm whose product is difficult to monitor 
would be suspicious of managerial rent extraction.  Our argument, though, is that some customers are only 
purchasing goods or services, while others are also purchasing warm glow.  See Shaviro, supra note 98, at 1003--04 
(suggesting that warm glow story is important for only some of the firms whose outputs are difficult to verify).  
Hansmann himself notes that hospitals likely do not fit into his framework, and are nonprofit for “historical” and 
tax-related reasons.  Hansmann, supra note 13, at 866--67.   
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up a relatively large portion of revenues may feel more constrained in providing high levels of 
executive pay.  Our second suggested mechanism, more general social disapprobation, could also 
be at play if executives’ and trustees’ social circles tend to give more recognition to leaders of 
organizations with greater donor support. Thus, we would expect that all else being equal, 
college and university president pay levels decline with the fraction of revenues that consists of 
current donations.110   
This is a particularly interesting prediction because, absent outrage, one would expect 
university president compensation to increase with increasing contributions as more effective 
fundraisers are rewarded for their success.  While the predicted association between religious 
affiliation and pay could be explained by other mechanisms, it is more difficult to come up with 
plausible alternative explanations for why compensation would decrease with fund-raising 
success.  As discussed below, several possible alternative explanations seem quite unlikely. 
3.  Unionization 
Other factors may be present in both the for-profit and nonprofit sectors but may have a 
differing impact on the outrage constraint in the two sectors.  For example, we would expect 
unionized employees to be more effective critics of high college or university president pay than 
non-unionized, generally less well-organized employees.111  Moreover, unionized employees 
may provide a more effective voice at nonprofit organizations, than at for-profit companies, 
because nonprofit managers will have greater difficulty in assigning responsibility for pay levels 
to market forces.  If so, the disciplining effect of unionization may be more discernible in the 
nonprofit sector.  
4. Institution-Specific Factors  
Although the factors discussed above lead us to think that private colleges and 
universities should provide a fertile laboratory for the study of managerial power and the outrage 
constraint, other features of the sector may make it more difficult for us to find strong evidence.  
In some cases, institution specific factors, such as particularly active press coverage, may swamp 
the impact of donors, unionization, or religious affiliation.  All else equal, trustees who anticipate 
widespread coverage of their pay decisions are likely to feel more constrained in awarding 
compensation than trustees who expect that their decision will fly under the radar.  Also, while 
university president pay has grown substantially in recent years, the growth and diversity in pay 
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 Again, however, the story may be more complicated.  As Hansmann describes, consumers may view the 
nonprofit form as indicating commitment not to divert profits to private actors.  Hansmann, supra note 13, at 845.  
Excessive compensation might undermine that perception and affect product sales by a nonprofit.  Thus, to the 
extent that a nonprofit provides goods or services, we might expect that nonprofit executive pay levels would also 
decline with the fraction of revenues consisting of sales.   
111
 On the general role of employees as potential checks on managerial rent-seeking, see Caers et al., supra note 44, 
at 40--41, and Fama & Jensen, Separation, supra note 13, at 321.  We find some correlation between the president 
pay and mean faculty compensation, see infra Table A.2., which could support a theory that employees help to 
constrain managerial pay at close to their own compensation levels.  But the correlation could also be due to cross-
school differences in prestige, wealth, and local cost of living and amenities.   
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does not match that of the for-profit sector.  Part of the explanation may lie in a difference in 
technology.  Without equity compensation, it is unlikely that public company executive pay 
would have grown to present levels.  This is not to suggest that there is inadequate variation to 
study university president pay, but only that the signal to noise ratio may be somewhat lower in 
this sector.   
III. Private College and University President Pay: Data and Analysis 
In this Part, we examine about a decade’s worth of data on the compensation of 
university presidents, donations to schools, other sources of revenue, expenditures, measures of 
quality, and a variety of other variables that could affect compensation.  We find evidence 
consistent with the idea that an outrage constraint plays a role in determining university president 
pay.  We also find evidence supporting our hypothesis that donors respond to high executive pay 
levels by reducing their contributions.  This latter finding adds additional support to our theory 
that donors represent an important source of potential outrage that serves to constrain nonprofit 
executive pay.  Although all of this evidence is consistent with the theory discussed in Part II, the 
evidence we provide, as is typical with work of this sort, does not enable us to make bold 
statements about causation.112   
A.  Sources of Data 
We explore the compensation of presidents of private colleges and universities with a 
sample comprised of the 341 colleges and universities that appear both in the Chronicle of 
Higher Education (CHE) “Private Universities” report and the National Center for Education 
Statistics (NCES) data for each of the nine years between 1999 and 2007.113   The CHE report 
compiles salary and other compensation data by drawing on tax return information filed by each 
school.  NCES is a division of the U.S. Department of Education that has as its mission the 
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 The problem, in a word, is “endogeneity.”  Endogeneity is a statistician’s term for the possibility that the 
direction of causation assumed by the statistical model is incorrect; technically, it describes any situation in which 
the measured variable is correlated with the estimated errors.  WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 11 
(6th ed. 2008).  This may be the result of the dependent variable—the outcome that is being predicted—in fact 
causing the factors we are using to analyze it. An example would be trying to predict why the sun rises, and 
concluding that it is caused in part by roosters crowing; there is a strong correlation, but our researcher has the 
causation story backwards. Another form of endogeneity can result from omitting a variable from the model that 
jointly causes both the dependent variable and the explanatory variable. An example could be a researcher observing 
a correlation between SAT scores and salary and concluding that employers pay high-scorers more; in fact, both are 
likely related to underlying intelligence or social capital. 
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 Although our study focuses on the period 1999 to 2007, we use lagged data for some variables.  
Our data derive from three main sources.  President salaries and other compensation come from the annual 
compilation by the Chronicle of Higher Education (CHE).  CHE’s figures in turn were harvested from Form 990 tax 
returns filed by the respective organizations.  Most other institution-level data, including religious affiliation, were 
downloaded from the National Center on Education Statistics (NCES).  NCES derives its data from regulatory 
filings required by the U.S. Department of Education.  We obtained each school’s fundraising costs, as well as other 
data used in our instrumental-variable regressions, by matching NCES data with corresponding university tax return 
information from the National Center on Charitable Statistics.  In addition, we hand-collected unionization and U.S. 
News ranking information for each school, as well as some demographic data on presidents, such as each 
individual’s tenure in office.  We deflated all dollar amounts to real values using the CPI. 
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collection and public distribution of information about institutions of higher education.114  For 
interested readers, we set out summary details and additional details about the construction of 
our data set in a Methodological Appendix. 
Average total reported compensation of the presidents in our sample was $365,000 in 
2007 dollars---that is, after adjusting for inflation. This average, however, masks a significant 
upward trend in pay levels across the period as portrayed in Figure 1.115 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
B. Existing Evidence on College and University President Pay 
 Before launching into our own analyses, it is worth briefly reviewing previous work on 
private college and university president pay.  Prior studies have established that the 
compensation of university presidents bears a fair relationship to the demands of the job and the 
personal characteristics of the president.  Studies of the nonprofit sector generally find a 
relationship between the size of an organization and the pay of its management.116  Several 
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studies of universities in particular similarly find that the size, complexity, and wealth of an 
organization predict its president’s pay.117  A number of others find that president pay is 
influenced by factors that could be described as measures of success, such as selectivity, 
rankings, and peer assessments, though others authors find no evidence of “pay for 
performance.”118  More experienced managers do earn more in studies that examine that 
question, though.119 
 Evidence on the questions we explore here is scant.  The most similar prior effort is 
Oster, who found no significant impact of a university’s ability to spend out of endowment on 
presidents’ pay.120  Oster’s results are difficult to rely on, however, because she studied only a 
small number of universities, looked at only one year, and did not control for most of the other 
factors affecting president pay we just noted.121  However, Oster did find some relation between 
dependence on donations and compensation in a slightly larger group of ninety-five nonprofits 
(only a handful of them educational organizations), albeit again with very limited institutional or 
personal-characteristic controls.122   
 Two earlier papers look for, and claim to find evidence inconsistent with, managerial 
power among nonprofits.  We have already discussed the efforts by Jobome, who studied a broad 
range of nonprofits in the U.K.123  In the university setting, Langbert and Fox report that the 20% 
of the presidents in their sample who were hired from within the university were paid less than 
their externally hired counterparts.124  They argue that this evidence is inconsistent with the 
managerial power hypothesis because internal hires “ought to have institution-specific human 
capital” and “more extensive ties to the Boards of Trustees” ---that is, greater managerial power-
--but instead they earn less.125   
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 Bartlett & Sorokina, supra note 116, at 59--64; Ying Sophie Huang & Carl R. Chen, Are College Chief 
Executives Paid Like Corporate CEOs or Bureaucrats?, 45 APPLIED ECON. 3035, 3036 (2013); Tang et al., supra 
note 15, at 411; Kim Boulanger & Jeffrey Pliskin, Determinants of Compensation of College Presidents 
(unpublished manuscript, 1999). 
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 Those finding evidence of a positive correlation include Bartlett & Sorokina, supra note 116, at 59--64; Huang & 
Chen, supra note 117, at 3036; Monks, supra note 101, at 344--47; Olga V. Sorokina, Executive Compensation: The 
Case of Liberal Arts College Presidents, 12 ISSUES IN POL. ECON., at [7--8] (2003); Tang et al., supra note 15, at 
411; and Rajiv D. Banker et al., The Compensation of University Presidents: A Principal-Agent Theory and 
Empirical Evidence (unpublished manuscript July 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1444849.  Those finding no link include Ehrenberg et al., supra 
note 94, at 26, and Peter Frumkin & Elizabeth Keating, The Price of Doing Good: Executive Compensation in 
Nonprofit Organizations, Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations Working Paper No. 8 (2001), available at 
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 Bartlett & Sorokina, supra note 116, at 59--64; Huang & Chen, supra note 117, at 3036. 
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 Oster, supra note 91, at 214.   
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 Id. at 211. 
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 See supra text accompanying notes 52--54. 
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 Mitchell Langbert & Marc Fox, The Compensation and Benefits of Private University Presidents, manuscript at 
13--14 (unpublished manuscript, Sept. 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2089641.    
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We are unpersuaded by Langbert and Fox.  Managerial power theorists in the for-profit 
context point out that outside hires often have greater negotiating leverage and must be paid a 
premium to leave their already-excellent job, which explains why they will often earn more than 
inside candidates.126  Moreover, we would not expect internal hires, who are usually university 
provosts or other lower ranking university officials, to have much managerial power because 
they do not have nearly the same ability to shape the board or the opportunities to interact with it 
as presidents.  In addition, employees signing their first contract with a charitable organization 
are exempt from IRS rules limiting excessive compensation, supplying a potential tax reason for 
outside hires to be paid more.127  Finally, we suspect that the Langbert & Fox results may be 
driven in part by the fact that interim presidents would typically be internal hires and would be 
paid less than permanent hires. 
A few other studies also supply some relevant data.  Ehrenberg and his co-authors find 
some evidence that successful fundraising increases a president’s compensation.128  Two studies 
examine the relationship between the percent of alumni donating and pay, reaching somewhat 
contradictory results: one finds a negative relationship, which is generally consistent with our 
finding, while the other finds no effect.129 
C.  Determinants of President Pay 
Like these earlier studies, we employ regression analysis techniques that allow us to 
investigate the impact of various factors on pay, holding other factors constant.  The dependent 
variable in our analyses is total reported compensation.  We measure the importance of 
stakeholder outrage for president compensation through three main explanatory variables – the 
proportion of the university’s annual budget derived from contributions and gifts, institutional 
religious affiliation, and faculty or staff unionization – and we control for the determinants of 
pay found to be important in these earlier studies, including various measures of the size of the 
institution, institutional quality, and tenure in office.  Our sample, again, is a panel of 341 
schools taken over a nine-year period, which allows us to explore variation over time as well as 
variation from school to school. 
 The analysis presents several empirical challenges.  To begin, methods of computing 
non-salary compensation vary between organizations, and, for reasons that we discuss below, it 
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 Michael C. Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the Other? Testing the Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting 
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 Treas. Reg. 53.4958-4.   
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is unlikely that the variation is random.  Thus, our results are best interpreted as measuring the 
determinants of reported, rather than actual, compensation.130 
Second, one of our primary variables of interest – the fraction of revenue from donations 
– may be related to president pay in more than one way.  As explained above, dependence on 
gifts captures to some degree donors’ leverage over the organization and its managers, and 
therefore should be negatively correlated with the organization’s preferences for higher pay.131  
This negative association is suggested by theory, and previous studies provide some support for 
it.132  However, as prior literature also reports, boards tend to reward successful fundraisers.133  
This positive correlation between pay and donations may obscure the negative correlation the 
outrage theory predicts.  Given the two competing forces, one would expect the relationship 
between donor dependence and pay to be non-linear.  Over some ranges of compensation, the 
outrage effect would dominate producing a negative association; over other ranges the 
fundraising effect would dominate producing a positive correlation.   
We test for this non-linear relationship by creating a series of non-linear fit plots -- 
basically, graphs in which our computer was allowed but not required to draw a curve rather than 
a straight-line relationship.  And, indeed, as exemplified by the “u-shaped” curve in Figure 2, the 
combination of the two effects results in the expected nonlinear relationship.  Accordingly, we 
include the square of the fraction of revenue from donations in our regressions to capture the 
nonlinear effect. 
 
Figure 2: Real Annual Compensation vs. Fraction of Revenue from Gifts 
                                                 
130
 We obtain qualitatively similar results when we use presidential salaries rather than total reported compensation 
as the dependent variable in our analyses. 
131
 We obtain quantitatively similar results when using alternative measures of the university’s dependence on gifts, 
such as gifts as a percentage of expenditures or gifts per student.   
132 Oster, supra note 91, at 214;  Langbert & Fox, supra note 124, at 16. 
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Endogeneity may present an additional challenge.  Unobserved aspects of presidential 
ability, such as strong leadership and fundraising skills, could simultaneously drive both giving 
and presidential pay.  Outside shocks to regional wealth or inflation could also drive both giving 
and pay.  Our primary solution to these problems, as further described in the appendix, is to 
employ president “fixed effects” that should control for unobservable variation in presidential 
ability and human capital.  Similarly, we employ state and year fixed effects to help account for 
the effects of local economic factors.  In any event, all of these relationships would tend to 
produce a positive relationship between pay and donations.  To the extent that we find a negative 
relationship, it should be in spite of, rather than because of, these unobserved influences.  We 
also employ a variety of other econometric techniques for overcoming endogeneity to double-
check the “robustness” of our result.  These, too, are described in more detail in the appendix.   
Table 1 summarizes our basic “ordinary least squares,” or “OLS” regression results; a 
more complete version of the table, including results for various control variables, can be found 
in the appendix. 
 
Table 1: Effects of Donation-Dependence on Compensation 
Variable Coefficient 
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(97,641.16)** 
% gift squared 549,525.79 
 
(195,669.68)** 
Relig. affil. -43,180.33 
 
(10,356.59)*** 
Staff union -11,526.80 
 
(19,107.65) 
Tuition 0.00070 
 
(0.00022)** 
Grants -0.000050 
 
(0.000081) 
Notes: *: significant at 5% level in a 2-sided test against the null;  
**: significant at 1% level ***: significant at .1% level;  
coefficient reported with (standard error); random-effects OLS 
 regressions with state and year effects; errors clustered by  
president; all regressors lagged one year.  
 
Overall, we find some support for our hypotheses.  We find two strong, opposing effects 
of increasing dependence on donations on presidential pay.  The linear effect is negative, 
statistically significant, and economically substantial in magnitude.  For example, the coefficient 
in our base “ordinary least squares” regression implies that a one-standard deviation increase in 
the fraction of revenue from gifts, which is about a 19% bump, would correspond to $54,583 (in 
1983 dollars) less reported compensation as a result of the linear effect, or about $111,426 less in 
2007 dollars.  For comparison, the median total compensation in the sample is $370,325 in 2007 
dollars.  At the same time, greater donations also lead to higher pay; the nonlinear effect was 
positive in sign, and statistically significant.  As expected, we find no evidence that grants or 
tuition constrain reported presidential pay.  Indeed, the sign of the coefficient on tuition is 
positive and significant.  Several possible explanations for this finding are discussed below. 
Turning to the other measures of outrage, we find significant constraints only from 
religious affiliation.  Our data confirm earlier results134 finding that religiously-affiliated 
presidents receive lower average compensation --- almost $88,000 less (in 2007 dollars) in our 
sample.  President pay was lower at schools where staff is unionized, but this relationship is not 
statistically significant. 
We did find significant results with the expected sign for a number of our institutional 
and personal-characteristic controls.  Schools with more resources pay more, and presidents earn 
more the longer they are in office.  President and faculty salaries tend to move in the same 
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 Oster, supra note 91, at 212, 214 (reporting lower pay at religious organizations generally, but finding no 
significant results for religious universities); Kent T. Saunders, Salary Study of College Presidents and Faculty: Are 
Salaries for Institutions in the Council of Christian Colleges and Universities Different From Other Private 
Institutions?, 2 CHRISTIAN BUS. ACAD. REV. 83, 85--88 (2007) (finding that presidents of religiously-affiliated 
colleges earned about $25,000 less than their peers during the 2005 academic year, and that presidents at a small 
group of self-identified Christian fundamentalist schools earned another $22,000 less). 
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direction, though no doubt some portion of that correlation is due to simultaneous shocks to the 
academic labor market.    
D. The Impact of President Pay on Contributions 
In order for donor dependence to constrain presidential pay in the manner we have 
hypothesized, it must be the case that donors care about presidential pay levels and respond, in 
aggregate, negatively to high compensation.  In other words, donor sensitivity is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for the proposition that dependence on current donations dampens pay 
levels.  We test donor sensitivity to compensation through an analysis of the determinants of 
annual giving.  Our prediction is that higher pay levels will be associated with reduced levels of 
contributions. 
It is not obvious that the aggregate donor response to high compensation would be to 
withhold or moderate contributions.  Some donors may be indifferent to president compensation.  
Other donors may view high executive pay levels as a signal of quality that justifies their 
support.  But still other donors may view high compensation levels as waste, a signal of poor 
governance, or an indication that the institution is already flush with funds.  Only in these latter 
cases would one expect a negative association between pay and donation levels, and the 
existence of such an association would depend on the latter effect outweighing any positive 
association between pay and donations.  Based on anecdotal evidence and analogous evidence 
from the public company sector,135 we expect a negative association between pay and donations 
to dominate, but that assumption must be tested. 
As before, we construct a panel derived from Chronicle of Higher Education 
compensation data and institutional variables from the National Center for Education Statistics 
and the National Center for Charitable Statistics.  Our dependent variable is simply total annual 
giving.  Since donors must first learn of compensation before they react to it, and the main 
source of compensation information is annual tax return data filed up to fifteen months after the 
beginning of the academic year, we expect to see any impact on giving only at some remove 
from the actual year of payment.  Thus, our main variables of interest are lagged measures of 
reported compensation--- i.e., measures from previous years.136 
Relying on lagged data also mitigates endogeneity concerns.  Our earlier results suggest 
both that higher pay can reduce giving and also that successful fundraising can increase pay.  
                                                 
135
 Although the view is not unanimous, there is evidence in the public company realm that shareholders take a dim 
view of high executive pay.  Marinilka Barros Kimbro & Danielle Xu, Should Shareholders Have a Say on 
Executive Compensation? Evidence from Say on Pay in the United States,  (unpublished manuscript, April 2013), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2209936, find that negative “say on pay” votes are 
associated with high levels of executive pay.  Jie Cai & Ralph A. Walkling, Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does it 
Create Value, 46 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANAL. 299 (2011), find that the unexpectedly overwhelming House 
passage of mandatory “say on pay” shareholder voting in 2007 resulted in a positive market reaction at firms with 
high abnormal CEO pay levels, suggesting that the discipline created by say on pay was welcome. 
136
 Our results using only salary, or using the difference between compensation and mean president compensation, as 
the main variables of interest are essentially identical.   
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But, of course, compensation in 2000 cannot be a reward for successful fundraising in 2002.  
Admittedly, though, both high compensation and generous contributions may be the products of 
some third variable we cannot measure, such as the charm, gregariousness, social connections, or 
talent of the president.  Once more, we control for these possibilities by using president fixed 
effects.  If this approach does not fully eliminate the role of unobserved human capital, then the 
regression coefficients on reported compensation will be biased upwards---in other words, we 
expect that the hidden factors will tend to produce a positive correlation between pay and 
donations.  Since we predict a negative correlation between pay and donations, the effect of these 
personal characteristics will therefore tend to obscure our hypothesized result.   
Our basic results are presented in Table 2.  Once more, we report controls and robustness 
checks in the Appendix. 
 
Table 2: Determinants of Annual Contributions 
Variable Coefficient 
Lags of comp. -30.55 
  (total 1st & 2d) (12.27)* 
Non-Donative Revenues  0.062 
 
(0.0012)*** 
Years in office 43,424.91 
 
(157,480.11) 
Notes: *: significant at 5% level in a 2-sided test against the null; **: significant at 1% 
level ***: significant at .1% level; coefficient reported with (standard error); random-
effects OLS regressions with state and year effects; errors clustered by president.  
 
In general, we find an economically substantial and statistically significant negative 
relationship between reported compensation and donations in each of our analyses.  For example, 
the result of our base “ordinary least squares” regression suggests that an additional aggregate 
dollar of president compensation over the prior two years is associated with $30 less in 
donations.  Perhaps surprisingly, we find no evidence that longer-tenured presidents are more 
successful at bringing in funds.  This finding is consistent with our suggestion above that 
president fixed effects largely capture the impact of presidential human capital.   
The bottom line here, however, is clear.  Donors respond to high president pay by 
reducing contributions.  As a result, it is certainly plausible that at schools where donations 
contribute relatively more to overall revenues, presidents and trustees would have a stronger 
incentive to hold down reported compensation. 
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E.  Interpreting the Empirical Results 
As suggested above, our results are probably best understood as providing evidence 
regarding the determinants and effects of reported, rather than actual, compensation.  To be sure, 
the fact that our compensation data are drawn from federal tax returns, and therefore that willful 
misstatements are punishable with jail time,137 adds to our confidence in the accuracy of the 
numbers.  But prior to 2009, when the IRS revised its guidelines for reporting non-cash 
compensation, there were few established conventions for how organizations should account for 
the present-year value of deferred or in-kind payments.138  CHE’s data for the 2009 academic 
year evince a larger fraction of payment in the form of benefits than we observe in our sample.139  
In light of the empirical evidence of concealed pay in the for-profit context, it is reasonable to 
assume that universities generally reported lower annual compensation where that was possible 
within the existing rules.140     
Our hypothesis further suggests that the degree of under-reporting was likely not random.  
Arguably, concealment works to reduce outrage because the average stakeholder rationally free-
rides on the efforts of others in acquiring compensation information.  When there is agency 
slack, boards of directors can therefore respond to outrage constraints either through reductions 
in real pay or reductions in reported pay.  To avoid tax-fraud prosecution, the board can 
camouflage pay by shifting cash compensation into other forms where reporting rules are looser.  
For example, the former president of one top research university was, according to its 2010 tax 
return, still collecting over $100,000 per year for his past services, even while not retired and still 
earning a separate salary for serving on its faculty.141  That expected cost was not clearly 
reported during his time in office.142   
Econometrically, the possibility that camouflage substitutes for real reductions means 
that our results are not fully reliable as evidence of the economic importance of compensation 
per se.  If greater donor pressure creates increased incentives to camouflage, we cannot tell 
whether the results we observe reflect changes in real pay, changes in reporting practices, or 
some combination.   
                                                 
137
 26 USC § 7206. 
138
 See Kertz, supra note 12, at 865--66 (noting wide inconsistencies in compensation reporting by charities); Julie 
Niklin, Colleges Are Evasive About Presidents’ Benefits Packages, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 24, 2000. 
139
 Benefits represented 22.7% of total compensation in CHE’s academic-year 2009 data, while comprising between 
13.4 and 17.4% of compensation over the period of our sample. 
140
 See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 795-834 (providing examples of public company pay practices 
consistent with the managerial power view); Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 7, at 832--51 (public company 
pensions); Walker, supra note 38 (stock option backdating); see also Ehrenberg et al., supra note 94, at 30 
(reporting that universities may use deferred compensation because it is “less visible”). 
141
 President and Fellows of Harvard College, IRS Form 990 FY2010, available at 
http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2011/530/199/2011-530199180-085e1806-9.pdf. 
142
 Harvard’s tax return for 2006 did disclose that its then-departing President would be paid “miscellaneous” 
expenses, loan benefits, and a future award totaling “less than one year’s salary at the time of resignation.”  
President and Fellows of Harvard College, IRS Form 990 FY2006, page 17, available at 
http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/orgs/profile/042103580?popup=1#forms.  The return also notes that the value of the 
President’s free housing is not included in the reported compensation figure.  Id.   
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However, from a policy perspective, outrage-induced shifts in pay design and reported 
compensation may be as important as reductions in “real” compensation.  As Bebchuk, Fried, 
and Walker argue in the public company context, compensation arrangements designed with 
camouflage in mind may fail to provide desirable incentives and may even provide perverse 
incentives.143  Whether donor pressure constrains actual compensation, or instead only distorts 
the form in which pay is presented, we have provided evidence that pressure from donor outrage 
changes agents’ behavior.  Likewise, the fact that reported compensation impacts donors’ 
willingness to support the university is significant for policy and for university planning, even if 
donors are not responding to fully accurate information. 
1. Reliance on Current Donations 
With that significant caveat in mind, we attribute our finding of a negative association 
between president pay and the fraction of university revenue derived from current donations as 
evidence consistent with the idea that the prospect of donor outrage would have a moderating 
influence on pay.  We buttress this argument with evidence that donors care about and respond to 
president pay levels.   
We find alternative possible explanations for our results less persuasive.144  As noted 
above, Langbert and Fox found a negative association between the percent of alumni who donate 
and president pay, and one would expect these two metrics – dependence on current donations 
and rate of alumni giving – to be correlated.145  Langbert and Fox labeled this result 
counterintuitive, but offered two explanations.  They suggested it was “plausible” that the alumni 
giving rate would be a proxy for a teaching orientation and that presidents of teaching-oriented 
schools would be paid at a lower rate.146  We control for this possibility using grants, Carnegie 
category (a descriptor for the entity’s primary mission, such as “research university” or “liberal-
arts college”) and U.S. News ranking, and still find a negative influence of donation-dependence 
on pay.  Second, Langbert and Fox suggested that the alumni giving rate might reflect the level 
of alumni involvement in governance, “which may … moderate administrators’ salaries.”147  We 
agree.  This latter view is consistent with the outrage hypothesis. 
It has been suggested to us that unobserved negative shocks to a university’s fortunes, 
such as a major scandal, might provide an explanation for the negative correlation we observe 
between pay and the fraction of revenue coming from current donations.  The theory would be 
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 Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 756-57; see also Emmanuel Saez et al., The Elasticity of Taxable Income with 
Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 3, 6--18 (2010), for an argument in the 
tax context that what appear to be second-order behavioral effects can have important efficiency consequences.   
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 Jobome suggests that organizations that are more dependent on donations may adopt more conservative pay 
practices since donation levels may be volatile and these organizations would wish to avoid high fixed compensation 
costs.  Jobome, supra, at 347.  We doubt that this phenomenon would have much explanatory power in the 
university setting, where tuition revenues provide a relatively stable revenue stream. 
145
 Langbert & Fox, supra note 124, at 16. 
146
 Id. 
147
 Id. 
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that universities are forced to pay a premium to a “fixer” president who will enter after a scandal 
and that the scandal would also depress donations.  This possibility seems unlikely to explain our 
results.  Major scandals are not common,148 and tests for the influence of outliers showed little 
impact, suggesting that our results are not caused by a few instances of scandal.  This theory 
would also predict that, if the scandal effect is big enough to drive our regression results, then 
first-year presidents should on average receive a pay premium, but we find instead that mean 
compensation increases with tenure in office. 
We also interpret our results to support the presence not only of donor outrage but also 
significant agency costs.  We observe that donors with greater leverage are apparently better able 
to hold down presidential pay.  This implies that donors with less leverage are paying more than 
they would prefer.   
A slightly different interpretation may be that presidents find it especially easy to draw on 
endowment earnings and tuition to pay themselves.  Schools with large endowment earnings and 
tuition revenue will tend to have a lower dependence on donations, and so these two factors may 
help to explain the correlations we find.  Because of weak monitoring by students and parents, 
tuition dollars are a less-constraining source of funds than many others.  Or, similarly, both 
tuition and high president pay may be the result of high agency costs for the university’s 
principals.  Admittedly, a third story could be that tuition is or is perceived to be a measure of 
institutional quality or consumer demand.  For example, we do find a modest correlation between 
gross tuition (i.e., not net of financial aid) and membership in upper-echelon U.S. news rankings 
in our sample.    
Our findings on the relation between tuition and compensation therefore lend some 
additional support to our agency-cost story.  Again, we find a fairly sizable, statistically 
significant correlation between tuition and president pay.  A one-deviation increase in tuition 
correlates with a compensation increase of roughly $94,000 in 2007 dollars.  That relationship is 
not simply a measure of available resources, since we also control for total revenues and 
enrollment.  We therefore believe the most likely explanations are various forms of free riding. 
The relation between endowment and earnings is less clear.  Consistent with prior 
research, we find a strong correlation between endowment and compensation.149  But we cannot 
easily distinguish between an agency-cost story and one in which boards simply reward 
managers who take on the challenge of managing billions of dollars in assets.150       
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 Marion R. Fremont-Smith & Andras Kosaras, Wrongdoing by Officers and Directors of Charities: A Survey of 
Press Reports 1995--2002, 42 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 25 (2003). 
149
 See, e.g., Core et al., supra note 13, at 309. 
150
 See Robin L. Bartlett & Olga Sorokina, Determinants of Presidential Pay at National Liberal Arts Institutions, 
29 REV. HIGHER EDUC. 53, 54, 57 (2005) (arguing that leaders of wealthier schools face greater complexity and risk 
of poor endowment performance).  Core et al. argue that a “higher compensation for greater challenges” story 
cannot explain their result, because they include a measure of how efficiently the firm spends its money on program-
related activities.  Core et al., supra note 13, at 328.  But that does not measure the President’s success at managing 
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2. Religious Affiliation  
Consistent with the work of others, we show that presidents of institutions with a 
religious affiliation tend to be paid less than presidents of completely secular schools.  We argue 
that one explanation for this effect, consistent with the managerial power theory, is that observer 
thresholds for what constitutes outrageous compensation would be lower in the case of 
religiously affiliated institutions.  But our data do not allow us conclusively to test or reject other 
plausible explanations for the association we observe, and it does seem likely to us that self-
selection and substitution of “warm glow” for cash compensation would also contribute to this 
association.  One test we do perform is to include the combined effects of religious affiliation 
and years in office in our regression.  When we do that, we see that the initial discount for 
religiously-affiliated pay is about half that in our other regressions, and that the increment for 
time in office is also smaller.  This may somewhat favor the outrage constraint hypothesis, in that 
it seems as though religious affiliation holds down pay in part by reducing its rate of increase, 
rather than simply by matching managers with lower demand for cash to institutions that pay 
less.   
F. An Agency Cost Explanation for the Time Trend Data 
 Time-series analysis of presidential pay also supports our agency cost story.  As shown in 
Figure 1, average university president pay climbed steadily and significantly between 1997 and 
2007.  It is difficult to imagine why the value of individuals willing to serve as presidents would 
have increased by 50% over this period.  In fact, the compensation of public company CEOs – 
participating in one alternative labor market – was relatively flat over this period and the risk of 
being fired from a public company CEO position increased, reducing (somewhat) the 
attractiveness of these positions.151   
 So what does explain the upward trend in university president pay during this decade?  
We cannot be certain and offer only suggestive statistical evidence, but the trend is consistent 
with an agency cost explanation.   
 We note first that average tuition dollars, both gross and net, increased by about 40% 
over the period that average pay increased by about 50%.  We suggested above that the positive 
association between tuition and pay might reflect the fact that tuition dollars carry lower levels of 
monitoring and can more easily be channeled into compensation.   
 Second, the final Intermediate Sanctions regulations were issued by the IRS in January, 
2002.  In order to create the rebuttable presumption that pay is reasonable under these 
                                                                                                                                                             
the firm’s investment portfolio or the risk premium she might demand for doing so.  Another potential difficulty 
with the Core et al. results is that they assume the highest-compensated individual reported on the firm’s tax return 
is the CEO, but in many universities that individual is actually the football coach or endowment manager.  
Obviously there would be a strong correlation between the salary of the endowment manager and the size of the 
endowment.   
151
 See Huang & Chen, supra note 117, at 3036 (noting that public firm pay grew at 2% annually while university 
president compensation grew by 8% annually in real terms between 1997 and 2004 in their sample). 
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regulations, boards must show that they obtained and relied on appropriate data in determining 
pay.152  The process through which organizations collect and analyze pay data at peer institutions 
is known as benchmarking.153  It is widely suspected that the advent of benchmarking led to an 
upward spiral in pay levels at public companies.154  The use of benchmarking to justify executive 
raises and option grants mitigated outrage.  Outrage was reduced when these pay packages were 
placed in the context of pay packages received by peer executives and some of the responsibility 
for pay levels could be shifted to compensation consultants who designed the plans and opined 
on comparability.155  Moreover, as no board wants to admit that its CEO is below average, 
boards typically target pay levels at between the 50th and 75th percentile of peer compensation.156  
As a result, pay levels tend to ratchet upwards. 
 It is plausible that, given increased “free cash flow” in the form of increased tuition 
dollars, increased use of benchmarking sparked by the implementation of the Intermediate 
Sanctions regulations contributed to greater year-on-year increases in mean pay.157  Look again 
at the graph presented in Figure 1 and reproduced here.  Note that the slope of a line fitted to the 
top of these bars tilts upwards around 2002.  The benchmarking hypothesis is supported by a 
regression analysis that includes peer university presidential salary information and a “dummy” 
variable for years after 2001.  These two variables are interacted and the interaction term is 
positively associated with president pay, suggesting that the compensation of peer presidents was 
a more important factor in determining pay after the advent of the Intermediate Sanctions 
regulations than before.  To be sure, there are other possible explanations for the uptick in pay 
levels post-2001, and we do not argue that this analysis provides definitive evidence of the 
mechanism we suggest, but the data is certainly consistent with the idea that agency costs and 
outrage play a role in the determination of university president pay. 
Figure 1b 
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 Treas. Reg. § 53-4958-6(b). 
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 For a theoretical overview, see Rachel M. Hayes & Scott Schaefer, CEO Pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect, 94 J. 
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 Charles M. Elson & Craig K. Ferrere, Executive Superstars, Peer Groups, and Overcompensation: Cause, Effect, 
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 See Frumkin & Clark, supra note 12, at 472 (offering this hypothesis); Manny, supra note 63, at 536 (same). 
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IV. Implications 
A. Implications for Tax Law and the Law of Nonprofit Organizations 
The theory and evidence presented in this paper suggest that potential donor outrage 
constrains the compensation of private college and university presidents.  Where donors have 
greater voice, pay is lower.  We have also documented a steady upward rise in average president 
compensation over the decade preceding the recent financial crisis.  Two questions follow.  Is 
there reason to be concerned about executive pay in this and other nonprofit sectors?  If so, what, 
if anything, can be done about it? 
 
1. Reasons for Concern 
Even if one accepts our view that outrage constrains university president pay, it is not 
obvious that pay levels are suboptimally high at institutions where current contributions are 
relatively insignificant.  It is fair to say in these cases that compensation packages are larger than 
would be preferred by donors, but why are donors the arbiters of appropriate pay levels?  The 
situation is different than in the public company executive pay realm where we, at least, are 
satisfied to conclude that the shareholders should be treated as principals and that deviations 
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from shareholder preferences should be avoided.158  In the nonprofit sphere, the principal is less 
obvious.  There are numerous stakeholders – customers (here students), donors, employees – but 
no obvious single class of principals for whom the trustees act as agents. 
Nonetheless, in matters of executive pay, we believe that the preferences of nonprofit 
donors are more likely to be aligned with the preferences of all of the various stakeholders than 
are the preferences of the managers themselves.  If one believes that trustees do little more than 
balance executive appetites for more pay against donor outrage, one is likely to conclude that pay 
at donor-constrained schools is more nearly optimal than at schools insulated from donor 
pressures.159  If so, then the conventional wisdom among nonprofit theorists that principal-agent 
slack is pervasive in the sector, especially among large, complex organizations,160 also extends to 
the pay-setting process.  Our conclusion, then, is that university president compensation is likely 
to be suboptimally high at schools that are relatively insulated from donor oversight.  Still, why 
worry?  Aren’t pay levels fairly modest when compared with public company executive pay? 
To be sure, the presidents of the schools in our sample earn much less than the CEOs of 
Fortune 500 firms, whose multi-million dollar pay packages are regularly lambasted in the news, 
but private colleges and universities generally wouldn’t be included in the Fortune 500 if they 
were for-profit enterprises.  In terms of assets and revenues, the average private college or 
university more closely resembles a small cap company, at best.  In 2007, the mean salary of the 
CEOs of the S&P Small Cap 600 was $540,000, and total mean compensation was $2.3 
million.161  Using that as a reference, mean reported 2007 compensation of our private college 
and university presidents of $455,000 is not insignificant. 
In any event, the absolute dollars at stake are only a small part of the picture.  The 
economic cost of excess compensation in this sector is likely to be much larger.  The potential 
outrage constraint associated with substantial revenue from current contributions may distort 
executive decision-making.  Recognizing the outrage constraint associated with healthy current 
donations, presidents may choose to suboptimally stress efforts to increase tuition and attract 
government grants and de-emphasize fundraising.  Less significantly, presidents may attempt to 
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camouflage compensation by shifting it into pensions, housing, foundation-based payments, and 
the like.162  Further, in addition to depressing donations, which we have demonstrated, high 
president pay levels may adversely affect the morale and productivity of non-executive 
employees in this sector.163     
2. What Can Be Done to Improve Donor Oversight of Nonprofits? 
If donor pressure does matter at least for some kinds of governance decisions, regulators 
can take steps to improve the usefulness of donor behavior.  For example, nonprofit regulators 
with scarce resources---which, in the United States, is all of them164 ---may prefer to focus their 
energies on organizations that are less dependent on donors.  Or they may give closer attention to 
organizations where donations drop noticeably.  Of course, that suggestion assumes that donor 
pressure reduces actual rent-seeking by organization managers, rather than simply increasing 
managers’ efforts to shroud their excessive pay.  Regulations whose goal is to affect actual 
outcomes should ensure that disclosures reveal real information about the organization.165   
Along these lines, recent revisions to the Form 990 instructions, if followed closely by 
nonprofits, should reduce considerably organizations’ ability to reduce reported compensation 
without also diminishing its value.166  For example, the new instructions require the organization 
to calculate the actuarial value of changes in a defined-benefit pension plan, and to report 
pensions and other deferred payments even if not yet vested.167  So far, it is too early yet to 
assess fully the changes’ impact.  We would also recommend accurate reporting of free housing 
and transportation, regardless of whether those items are taxable as income for the president. 
It is unclear to what extent the Form 990 Instructions provide organizations with real 
incentives to report accurately.  Failure to comply with the instructions has no consequences, 
except in the extreme case in which managers and preparers are subject to fraud or abuse 
penalties.   
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stakeholder democracy, among other options, seem like better choices.   
166
 Form 990 is the annual tax return for nonprofit organizations.  For more extended discussion of the revisions and 
their governance implications, see Evelyn Brody, Sunshine and Shadows on Charity Governance: Public Disclosure 
as a Regulatory Tool, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 183, 197--201 (2012); Fishman, supra note 165, at 563--77. 
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 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990 RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME 
TAX 30 (2012). 
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The IRS could potentially provide stronger incentives to report if the new disclosure rules 
were made part of the “4958 safe harbor.”  Again, organizations and managers that follow 
certain procedures, such as requiring CEO compensation to be set by independent board 
members after review of relevant comparable salary information for other CEO’s, are 
presumptively insulated from statutory penalties for paying or authorizing excessive 
compensation.168  Anecdotal evidence, such as Guidestar’s prominent warnings about manager-
level 4958 penalties shown side-by-side with links for their “comparables study” service, suggest 
that managers value the safe harbor, as do our findings about the effect of the 2002 final 4958 
regulations.   
Therefore, we propose making clear, public, and contemporaneous disclosure of the 
terms of each contract, along with valuations of the reasonably-expected costs of the contract 
terms computed along the lines of the revised 990 Instructions, a requirement of the safe harbor.  
For instance, the University might post prominently the actual employment agreement it signs 
with the President, together with calculations of the expected cost of each item.169  That could 
help to ensure that donor pressure is directed towards the actual substance of each contract, not 
it’s reporting.170  Our data also suggest that contemporaneity is important, because delays in 
reporting appear to result in delays in donor behavior.  As for the existing safe harbor provisions, 
while our evidence does not conclusively show that they have driven up pay, we think at a 
minimum they should be carefully re-considered. 
Although we think this proposal is modest, for those concerned about the impact of 
uniform, inflexible federal law on the space available for innovation in nonprofit governance, we 
also suggest changes to default state rules.  As we noted earlier, state law prohibits nonprofits 
from distributing profit in the form of “unreasonable” compensation, but judicial practice is to be 
exceptionally deferential to board decisions about what is a reasonable compensation package.  
Judicial deference rests on the “business judgment rule,” which is just an assumption that boards 
are better informed and better able to manage the organization than most judges.171  Managerial 
power, however, erodes the basis for the business judgment rule.  In the presence of managerial 
power, compensation awards are not based wholly on the considered expert decisions of the 
board, but instead reflect in large measure the manager’s own judgment about what she should 
be paid.   
                                                 
168
 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6.   
169
 We are grateful to Mary Bilder for this suggestion. 
170
 An alternative approach would be to increase monitoring of nonprofit executive employment contracts and 
practices.  For example, Geoffrey Manne has proposed that nonprofit organizations hire private for-profit 
monitoring firms that would be granted the contractual right to sue for breach of fiduciary duty, with monitors’  
profit objective and reputational constraints leading to efficient monitoring.  Manne, supra note 13, at 252--264.  
This model may be in some disrepute following the apparent failures of credit-rating agencies to avert the 2007 
credit crisis, though Manne’s proposal would give rather more power to monitors than the rating agencies held. 
171
 WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 250 (3rd ed. 
2009). 
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We therefore propose that state law should set up a default rule under which 
compensation awards can be reviewed as though they were self-dealing transactions.  That is, 
since the manager’s pay is set by someone who has a stake in the outcome, judges should review 
those determinations much more closely and carefully than they would otherwise.  Organizations 
able to craft alternative governance structures to deal with managerial self-dealing could opt out 
of the rule, but we suggest that they be required to disclose that fact prominently to donors.  In 
that way, donors could choose which set of compensation rules they believed best protected their 
interests, creating a market for the most efficient rule.   
Of course, if organizations believed our proposal were the best policy, they could amend 
their by-laws tomorrow to adopt it.  We suggest that our rule be the default, however, because it 
is aimed mostly at protecting a diffuse group of donors and other stakeholders against the 
concentrated and already-entrenched interests of management.  That is, we would require 
nonprofits to act to opt out of our proposal, rather than having to overcome the burden of inertia 
to opt in.  Given the collective-action problems that face the stakeholders in such a contest, we 
agree with Bebchuk and Jackson’s argument (in a parallel for-profit context) that law should 
stack the deck in favor of the stakeholders.172  
 
B. Implications for the Managerial Power Theory of the Executive Pay 
Setting Process 
As discussed above, to date researchers focused on public company executive pay have 
not found unequivocal proof that outrage constrains compensation.  Prior evidence has generally 
been circumstantial; although the fact that boards of directors seem to take great pains to 
diminish the ease with which other stakeholders can add up total pay is highly suggestive, 
commentators have suggested pro-efficiency explanations for many of these “hidden” pay 
structures.173  In contrast, we find straightforward evidence that dependence on donors puts 
pressure on universities to reduce reported presidential compensation, and that contributor 
displeasure at high reported compensation is registered through lower donations.  We also find 
evidence consistent with the outrage constraint being set at a lower level at institutions with 
religious affiliations. 
However, even if one views our evidence as supporting the existence of an outrage 
constraint at nonprofit institutions, can we extrapolate to the for-profit sector?  In other words, 
have we found evidence of a general phenomenon or a phenomenon specific to the nonprofit 
universe?  To be sure, donors to universities are a different kind of stakeholder than shareholders 
in a firm.  But the differences may be smaller than they appear at first glance.  In both cases, 
these constituencies are “represented” by a board of directors that, for the reasons discussed 
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 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 
103--04 (2010). 
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 E.g., Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Contracting 
Theories, 15 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 486, 493 (2009). 
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above, may be disinclined or unable to negotiate vigorously with their chief executives.  At the 
very top, there is a similarity of structure and a similarity in agency problems. 
Moreover, prior research suggests that, just as charitable contributors are motivated in 
part by their emotional connection to their charity,174 so too many shareholders have preferences 
for “sustainable” or “no sweat” firms, or other markers of their ideological preferences.175  Firms 
may donate to charity and participate in politics in part in order to shape their image for 
investors, employees, and customers.176  In other words, both ideology and return on investment 
are part of the utility function for both nonprofit and for-profit stakeholders.   
Admittedly, universities are also subject to legal limits on pay that do not bind most for-
profit firms.  Perhaps the responsiveness of university executive pay to donors could reflect fears 
that donor ire would trigger IRS scrutiny.  That story is consistent with some of our results, but 
would not explain our finding that donors themselves respond to compensation news. 
 In sum, we believe the agency problems in the two spheres are sufficiently similar that 
the evidence provided here of outrage constraining college and university president 
compensation supports the hypothesis that outrage constrains pay in the public company sector.  
This conclusion should provide some comfort for those advocating additional transparency and 
shareholder voice in that sphere that reducing the agency problem is likely to improve executive 
compensation practices.177 
V. Conclusion 
This Article provides evidence suggesting that greater reliance on contributions as a 
source of funding puts downward pressure on the reported compensation of presidents of private 
colleges and universities, that higher disclosed compensation tends to discourage giving, and that 
the compensation of presidents of institutions with a religious affiliation are lower than those of 
peers at wholly secular schools.  These results lend support to the theoretical suggestion that 
stakeholder outrage may constrain executive pay, and may require some updating of the 
conventional wisdom that investments in monitoring nonprofit pay are wasteful.  For example, 
skyrocketing tuition remains a major social problem, and our results suggest that university 
president pay dynamics could well be a contributing factor.       
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 See B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Behavioral Public Economics: Welfare and Policy Analysis with 
Nonstandard Decision-Makers, in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 7, 25--30 (Peter Diamond & 
Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2008), for a review. 
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 See John L. Campbell, Why Would Corporations Behave in Socially Responsible Ways? An Institutional Theory 
of Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 ACADEMY OF MGMT. REV. 946 (2007) for a review; see also Rodrigues, 
supra note 13, at 1287--88 (comparing social meaning of participation in nonprofit and for-profit firms). 
176
 Henderson & Malani, supra note 13, at 577--81.  But see Roy Schapira, Corporate Philanthropy as Signaling 
and Co-Optation, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1889, 1900--18 (2012) (suggesting that evidence for this story is unclear, 
and offering alternatives such as possibility that corporate philanthropy is intended as a costly signal of financial 
strength). 
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 Cf. Murphy, supra note 10, at 855 (“Outrage costs are critical to the [Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker] analysis….”). 
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Methodological Appendix 
 
Data 
As noted in the main text, our sample comprised all organizations appearing in both the 
CHE and NCES data for the years 1999 through 2007.  Three hundred forty-one institutions met 
these criteria.  Although there is some chance that limiting the sample only to universities that 
appear for nine consecutive years could introduce a “survivor bias,” including schools that 
entered or exited the group midstream is more problematic.  Start-up organizations, or those on 
the edge of collapse, may differ significantly in their organizational dynamic from the typical, 
long-standing and stable entities that make up most of the sample and about which we are 
primarily interested.  Our sample extends back as far as NCES data permit for our variables of 
interest, and terminates at 2007 to avoid the potentially confounding effects of a severe recession 
on charitable giving.   
We also drop select observations within the sample to account for the limitations of our 
data.  We omit from our analyses observations in which the reported salary of the president was 
zero.  In all cases, as best we can tell, these observations can be explained by the fact that the 
president in question belongs to a religious order whose members forswear material wealth.  In 
many instances the president’s order is reimbursed for his or her services, but the precise amount 
cannot be discerned.178  We also omit cases in which more than one individual served as 
president of an institution in a single year.  The Chronicle’s data do not make clear whether the 
figures reported for partial-year service represent annualized or actual compensation, leaving us 
unable to determine the correct amount to include.  Moreover, compensation provided in 
transitional years may not be representative of steady-state pay levels.  
Our key variables and mean levels for each (in 2007 dollars) are reported in Table A1 
below.  Almost 18% of university revenue over this period was derived from gifts.  Staff was 
unionized at 19% of these schools.  Somewhat surprisingly, 46% of schools are reported as 
having a religious affiliation.   
<Table A1> 
Determinants of Pay 
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 For example, the 2009 Form 990 for Boston College reports that the university paid over $3 million to the 
Society of Jesuits in return for services rendered to BC by members of the order.  But the return does not separately 
identify how much was paid for each individual employee.   
As best we can tell, universities that pay their leaders a meaningful salary do not also compensate the leaders’ 
clerical order for their services.   
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As described in the main text, to mitigate endogeneity concerns we employ president 
fixed effects and other measures of presidential human capital.179  A potential complication, 
however, is that presidential pay can also affect donations, implying that regressors derived from 
total contributions could be correlated with lags of our dependent variable.  We would argue that 
most of this relationship can be attributed to individual characteristics of the president already 
controlled for in the regression, such as fundraising prowess and tenure in office.  However, to 
account for the possibility that past shocks to pay may have been due to luck or other factors not 
unique to the president, we also present separately a regression in which we control for lagged 
compensation.180  Given that the first lag of pay is mathematically related to the error term of our 
regression, we instrument for it using the system GMM method of Bond (2002).181  Because 
system GMM relies on first differences, we cannot provide estimates of invarying, constantly 
varying, or small-variation variables in that specification.    
Although generally system GMM is more efficient than alternatives such as Hausman-
Taylor, to capture estimates of the time-invarying variables we also estimate a Hausman-Taylor 
regression in which we treat percent gifts and percent gifts squared as endogenous to the 
president fixed effects.  We again obtain quantitatively similar results to our OLS regression, 
except that the effect of religious affiliation is now similar in size to our OLS regression (at -
41,759) but less precisely estimated, so that it is significant only at the 10% level.  We used 
Schaffer & Stillman’s “xtoverid” Stata routine to obtain cluster-robust standard errors for the 
Hausman-Taylor regressions.    
As an additional check, we also use 2SLS to include several different instruments for 
donation-dependence.  First, using firm-level data from the National Center on Charitable 
Statistics, we compute the total donations to all institutions of secondary and higher education in 
each state for each year, and divide that by total revenues at those institutions.  Additionally, we 
use fundraising expenditures, which are strongly correlated with donations, but have no obvious 
causal connection to executive compensation.182  Since we have no clear theoretical prior on 
whether overall fundraising is more important than fundraising per student, we employ both.  In 
all cases, we use squares of the IV variables to instrument for percent-grants squared. 
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 Of course, using presidents rather than universities as our panel variable means that we cannot control for 
unobserved university characteristics, but we believe that unlike human capital, most of the important pay-
determining variation in institutions is already measured in our other data.   
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 We obtain similar results controlling only for first or for both first and second lags of compensation.     
181
 Stephen R. Bond, Dynamic Panel Data Models: A Guide to Micro-Data Methods and Practices, 1 PORTUGUESE 
ECON. J. 141, 141--62 (2002). 
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 Conceivably, a nonprofit executive could extract value from the nonprofit by operating a fundraising firm and 
then contracting with the firm to do fundraising for the nonprofit.  But most universities have policies that prohibit 
presidents from such extensive outside activity, and obvious conflicts of interest at that level would seldom escape 
close scrutiny.  In addition, it might be argued that, to the extent the president is involved in fundraising, a portion of 
the university’s reported fundraising costs may include a fraction of the president’s salary.  Average fundraising 
expenditures in our sample, however, were orders of magnitude larger than average president pay; changes in 
president pay should have no meaningful impact on reported fundraising.   
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Lastly on the robustness front, we recognize that our random-effects model relies on an 
assumption that the individual president effects are uncorrelated with our other regressors.  As an 
additional check, we estimate our equation using a population-averaged panel-data model, also 
known as a generalized estimating equation or “GEE.”183  GEE does not require any assumptions 
about the relationship between the individual effect and the other regressors.  It is, however, 
more precise if the researchers can specify the nature of the correlation between annual error 
terms.  Standard tests show some evidence for an AR(1) process in the errors, and weak evidence 
for AR(2).  We obtain qualitatively similar results to our random effects model under either 
assumption.    
We also include a vector of control variables, many inspired by prior literature.  As we 
described in Part III.B. above, researchers have found that organizational size, complexity, and 
status influence presidents’ pay, so we control for those factors using total revenues, total full-
time equivalent enrollment, log of total assets,184 size of the faculty, faculty:FTE-student ratio, 
faculty mean salary, whether the university has a teaching hospital, U.S. News and World Report 
ranking,185 and seventy-fifth percentile SAT scores for the entering first-year class.186  To 
account for the possibility that executive salaries are influenced by peer compensation, we 
additionally include the mean total compensation in the sample.     
In addition to president fixed effects, we attempt to account for variations in the quality 
of each president in several other ways.  Although outcome measures are notoriously difficult to 
identify in nonprofit settings, we include return on assets and graduation rate as approximations 
of the president’s success at managing the budget and ensuring student success.  Since presidents 
likely develop fundraising connections and learn from experience, we also hand-collected and 
included each president’s tenure in office.      
To account for differences in organizational focus and mission, we include a set of 
indicator variables for each of the major Carnegie Institution categories, such as “research 
university” and “liberal-arts college.”  We also include a full set of state and year fixed effects 
(and, in unreported results, university effects),187 which we expect to account for any variations 
in macro-economic factors, the tax-price of giving, or major regulatory differences across time 
and institutions.   
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 See Joseph C. Gardiner et al., Fixed Effects, Random Effects, and GEEL What are the Differences?, 28 STAT. IN 
MED. 221, 227--39 (2009) for an overview of the tradeoffs between the RE and GEE models.   
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 We use the natural log of assets because assets are highly skewed in our sample.   
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 We control for U.S. News rankings using indicator variables for U.S. News tiers in each of the research 
university and liberal arts college undergraduate hierarchies.  Unranked schools were coded as “third tier.”  U.S. 
News used a different reporting methodology for the 2002 academic year; regressions including U.S. News ranking 
omit data from that year.  Including 2002 but omitting U.S. News ranking does not change our results.      
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 SAT scores and U.S. News rankings are highly correlated.  Unsurprisingly, omitting one tends to produce 
considerably more significant results for the other.  Our main outcomes are robust to including only one of the two.   
187
 Our results are similar but less precise when university effects are included. 
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Finally, as in Sorokina (2003), we employ lags of all of our regressors.188  Presidential 
salaries are set in advance of the academic year.  The factors that determine compensation should 
logically be those prevailing at that time.  Although of course there is usually a strong correlation 
between most regressors and their lags, such that other studies using same-year data are likely 
still largely reliable, we believe our measures are more precise.  
We employ a random-effects model with robust standard errors clustered by president.189  
We use levels rather than logs because our equation includes both gifts and gifts squared.  Our 
main results are reported in Table A2, below.  For ease of reading, we omit state, year, and 
Carnegie-category effects and most insignificant controls. 
<Table A2> 
Admittedly, the 2SLS regression provides surprisingly large coefficients for the effects of 
donation-dependence.  We argue that our OLS result is probably biased upwards, but the 
difference here seems too large to be explained solely by bias in the OLS estimate.  Weak 
instruments would be a logical suspect, except that LIML estimates of the coefficients were quite 
close to those reported, which argues against a weak instrument problem.190  Possibly one or 
more of the instruments are picking up some other unobserved influence.191  Accordingly, we 
view the 2SLS results as only weakly confirming our results.    
Determinants of Donations 
As with the determinants of pay regressions, we also report two additional specifications 
as robustness checks on our OLS results.  In one specification we include lags of donations as a 
control for the possibility that, say, year-2000 donations affected year 2001 compensation.     
We also estimate a 2SLS regression using same-year compensation and number of 
executive employees per student as instruments for the lag of compensation.  We suggest that the 
president’s compensation during the same academic year as the dependent variable is an 
appropriate instrument for lags of compensation.  Because both compensation and donations can 
respond to each other only with at least a one-year delay, there should be no simultaneous 
causation between contemporary levels of each.  Although some omitted variable, such as 
university performance, may contribute to both, as in Andreoni & Payne (2011) we control for 
these potential confounds --- in our case, by using president fixed effects and observable 
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 Sorokina, supra note 118, at 4. 
189
 A Hausman test could not reject the null hypothesis that the RE estimator was consistent. 
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 JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JORN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS 209 (2009). 
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 Another potential explanation is that university donations also affect state-level donations.  The mean proportion 
of university to state donations in our sample was 8%, which may suggest that the state-level donations instrument is 
not fully exogenous.  To test this, we repeated our regressions, dropping observations where the university’s 
contributions to state donations exceeded 10%.  This brought the mean down to 2.3%, but we still obtained the same 
large coefficients.   
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measures of performance.192  Therefore, we arguably should be able to eliminate any correlation 
between same-year pay and the error terms of the regression.  The theory behind the proportion 
of executives is that it measures factors, such as principal-agent slack and institutional 
complexity, that should correlate with pay but do not have any evident direct connection to 
donations.  Both instruments are strongly correlated with lags of compensation in first-stage 
regressions.    
As in the pay regressions, we control for a variety of institutional and other factors, 
including fundraising, fundraising squared, state, year, and Carnegie-category fixed effects.  
Because the literature suggests that funding from other sources may either encourage or 
discourage private contributions,193 we control for both grants and liabilities.  We attempt to 
capture variation in fund-raising skill using years in office.  We also control for measures of 
mission success, institutional prestige, and wealth of the donors, such as U.S. News ranking, 
tuition, revenues, assets, mean faculty salary, and graduation rate.  We control for the size of the 
alumni body with enrollment, and for the possibility that undergraduates have more intense 
connections to their alma mater with the fraction of enrollees who are undergraduates.   
Our results are summarized in Table A3, below. 
<Table A3> 
For the most part our additional results confirm our OLS findings, although the 2SLS 
result for compensation is just shy of being significant at the 5% level.  As before, we obtain 
similar results using GEE to double-check our FE results; the combined effect of lagged 
compensation in the GEE regression was a bit larger, at -45.  And once more, our 2SLS estimates 
for the main variable of interest are larger than the others, although the difference here is not as 
great.  We therefore interpret the 2SLS result as lending some support to the idea that the OLS 
estimates are biased upwards.   
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 James Andreoni & A. Abigail Payne, Is Crowding Out Due Entirely to Fundraising? Evidence from a Panel of 
Charities, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 334, 340 (2011). 
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 E.g., Id. at 335; Cagla Okten & Burton A. Weisbrod, Determinants of Donations in Private Nonprofit Markets, 
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Table A1: 
Descriptive Statistics 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
 
Variable |          Observations  Mean      Std. Dev.    
 
% of Revenue from Gifts |       2990     .177       .190    
Annual Gifts |        2990     39984      91596    
Full-time Equivalent Enrollment |  2991     4808.47      4646.90    
F/T Execs. per 100 FTE Students | 2969     2.84       2.19 
Fundraising    2641  9996   22440 
Graduation Rate |         2128     .69       .16  
Gross Assets |         2991     1191360      3814800    
Hospital? (Indicator) |        2136     .05       .21     
Liabilities |         2991     310080      1446360    
Mean Faculty Salary |        2689     71.27      15.87   
Reported Pres. Benefits |        3565     53.59      88.96 
Reported Pres. Salary |       3578       286.88      180.76    
Revenues -- All Sources |        2991     322320      756840   
Revenues from Tuition |        2991     116484      139218  
Revenues from Grants |        2919     40596      121788    
Return on Investment |        2987     67728      359040   
Religious Affiliation? (Indicator)  |  3620     .46       .50     
President’s Years in Office |       3620     7.30       6.41       
SAT - 75th %ile |         2263     1293     125.3 
Staff Unionization (Indicator) 2811  .19   .39 
Total Reported Pres. Compensation |  3336       364.96     214.20    
 
Note: All dollar figures reported in thousands of 2007 dollars. 
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Table A2: 
Determinants of University President Compensation 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
 OLS Arellano-Bond 2SLS 
% gift -287,283.30 -169,919.3 - 1,978,243 
 
(97,641.16)** (78,316.16)* (814,671.50)** 
% gift squared 549,525.79 336,157.6 3,020,202 
 
(195,669.68)** (186,532.4)* (1366988)* 
Relig. affil. -43,180.33  - 25,310.71 
 
(10,356.59)*** 
 
(11,549.74)* 
Staff union -11,526.80  2020.57 
 
(19,107.65) 
 
(14,072.34) 
Tuition 0.00070 . 00028 .0010 
 
(0.00022)** (0. 000051)* (0. 00037)** 
Revenues 7.3e-6 0. 0000148 -0. 0000292 
 
(0.000033) (0. 000020) (0. 000047) 
RoI -0.000044 -0. 000024 -0. 000044 
 
(0.000035) (0. 000026) (0.000047) 
Log assets 17,425.49  28,201.06 
 
(9,019.90)* 
 
(11,487.42)** 
Grants -0.000050 8.94e-06 0. 000040 
 
(0.000081) (0. 000079 ) (0.00019) 
Fac. salary 2.64 2.73 2.61 
 
(1.01)** (0. 45)*** (1.32)* 
Enrollment -3.42  - 8.89 
 
(2.31) 
 
(4.97) 
Mean pres. pay -0.46 0. 41 -3.00 
 
(1.57) (0. 10)*** (2.24) 
Years in offc. 2,840.02  2,661.42 
 
(626.68)*** 
 
(706.29)*** 
R-squared .60  .48 
N 1,398 1,398 1,088 
 
Notes: 
*: statistically significant at the 5% level against a two-sided test of the null 
**: statistically significant at the 1% level against a two-sided test of the null 
***: statistically significant at the .1% level against a two-sided test of the null 
Robust standard errors clustered by president.  All regressors are lagged one year.  Control variables 
insignificant in all specifications are not reported.  OLS and 2SLS regressions include state and year fixed 
effects; GMM regression includes year effects. Dollar figures reported in 1983 dollars.   
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Table A3: 
Determinants of Annual Contributions 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
 OLS Arellano-Bond 2SLS 
Lags of comp. -30.55 -28.36 -61.74 
  (total 1st & 2d) (12.27)* (5.79)*** (32.21) 
Revenues 0.062 0.0420 0.063 
 
(0.0012)*** (0.0025)*** (0.0028)***
Tuition -0.13 0.1226 -0.043 
 
(0.137) (0.021)*** (0.045) 
Fundraising 1.86 2.3488 2.26 
 
(1.20) (0.3143)*** (0.6017)***
Fundraising ^2 -6.95e-8 -6.37e-8 -7.87e-8
 
(4.70e-8) (1.07e-8)*** (1.97e-8)***
Grants 0.16 0.044 0.28 
 
(0.126) (0.0151)** (0.023)***
Liabilities 0.0018 0.0041 0.0036 
 
(0.0013) (0.0011)*** (0.0007)***
Log assets 3,222,737.78  1,267,480.71 
 
(2,204,103.76) 
 
(1,764,298.85) 
Enrollment 2,573.90 -1,488.99 882.58 
 
(1708) (265.47)*** (691.54) 
Fac. salary 207.55  526.38 
 
(231.91) 
 
(222.65)* 
US News Top 25 27,414,397.74  9,855,543.69 
 
(12,987,490.09)* 
 
(9,045,568.049) 
Faculty:student -1,923,948.12  -2,193,387.77 
 
(787,798.9)** 
 
(284,323.08)***
Years in offc. 43,424.91  122,064.93 
 
(157,480.11) 
 
(120,069.21) 
R-squared .90  .92 
N 1,185 965 1,185 
 
Notes: 
*: statistically significant at the 5% level against a two-sided test of the null 
**: statistically significant at the 1% level against a two-sided test of the null 
***: statistically significant at the .1% level against a two-sided test of the null 
Robust standard errors clustered by president.  Control variables insignificant in all specifications are not 
reported.  OLS and 2SLS regressions include state and year fixed effects; GMM regression includes year 
effects. Dollar figures reported in 1983 dollars.   
 
 
  
